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THE FUTURE OF RUTAN V. REPUBLICAN PARTY
OF ILLINOIS: A PROPOSAL FOR INSULATING
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS FROM
POLITICAL PATRONAGE
[A] division of the Republic into two great
is to be dreaded as the greatest
parties.
political evil under our Constitution.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1976, in the landmark decision of Elrod v. Burns,2 the Supreme Court
of the United States firmly established that the dismissal of public employees for
reasons of political patronage or party affiliation violates the First Amendment.
Specifically, the Court held that requiring public employees to pledge their
allegiance to a political party imposes unconstitutional restraints on the freedoms
of speech and association? In 1980, Branti v. Finkel' reaffirmed this position
of protectionism. Both of these cases set forth that most patronage practices

1. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2741 (1990) (citing John Adams in
R. HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM 2-3 (1969) (footnote omitted)). See infra note 20.

2. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
3. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States expressly provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The
First Amendment expressly protects speech from governmental interference. The freedoms of
association, although not explicitly enumerated in the First Amendment, are inherently present within
a penumbra where belief and privacy are protected from governmental interference. NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding freedom of association to be an independent right possessing
an equal status with the other rights specifically enumerated in the First Amendment); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (setting forth that although freedom of association is not expressly
included in the First Amet.Jment, its existence is necessary in making the express guarantees fully
meaningful); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (expressing that specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance, and finding the right to marital privacy to be such a right existing within the
penumbral zone of privacy). See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that
requiring appellee to display a government composed state motto on his license plates violated his
first amendment right to refrain from speaking and associating); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (upholding the right of public school students to refuse to salute
flag); Thomas Irwin Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J.
1 (1964).
The constitutional implications of freedom of association in the patronage context are discussed
more fully at infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
4. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
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offend the First Amendment, and therefore, are not allowed.'
In 1990, the third case in this trilogy of political patronage cases
emphatically affirmed the position of the earlier courts. Rutan v. Republican
Party of Illinois' extended first amendment protection to politically motivated
hiring, promotion, transfer, or recall of governmental employees based on their
political affiliations. The Supreme Court held, using a strict scrutiny analysis
and relying on Elrod and Branti, that in addition to termination based on
political beliefs, hiring, promotion, transfer, and recall similarly impinge upon
the first amendment rights of public employees. 7 The Court reasoned that
although a person does not have a right to a government job, a state may not
deny that person ajob on a basis that infringes upon the person's constitutionally
protected interests- especially the person's interest in free speech and
association."
A question raised by the Rutan decision is whether these same constitutional
protections apply to independent contractors. 9 Despite the seemingly clear

5. The Court acknowledged that in some positions, however, partisan affiliation may be
necessary for the particular job if it was a position inherently of a policymaking nature, or if party
affiliation is crucial to the performance of the employee's job. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507,
518-20 (1980); Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367. These two exceptions are discussed further infra in section
II, notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, the focus of this note deals exclusively with adverse employment actions based
solely on political affiliation or belief, and is not concerned with "mixed-motive" or
"facially-neutral" employment discharges. These other patronage actions are addressed briefly at
infra note 196.
There are numerous cases involving political patronage in the government employment context
since Elrod v. Bums was decided. For an excellent comprehensive summary of these cases and the
holdings of the various federal circuit and state courts, see Richard P. Shafer, Annotation, Dismissal
of, or OtherAdverse PersonnelActionRelating to, Public Employee for PoliticalPatronageReasons
as Violative of FirstAmendment, 70 A.L.R. FED. 371 (1991).
6. 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990) (a five-four decision, with Justice Brennan writing the majority
opinion).
7. Id. See infra notes 89-110 and accompanying text for a more in-depth analysis of the
holding and reasoning of the Court.
8. Id. at 2735-36 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (holding that a state college
professor had a First Amendment claim if the state's refusal to review his contract was the result of
his public criticism of the school board's policies)). See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
9. An independent contractor can be defined as "one who, in exercising an independent
employment, contracts to do certain work according to his own methods, without being subject to
the control of his employer, except as to the product or result of his work." 41 AM. JUR. 2D
Independent Contractors § 1 (1964); BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 530 (6th ed. 1991). For the
purposes of this note, a working definition of independent contractors will be confined to contractors
who perform duties traditionally performed by the public employees in the past, or jobs public
employees could do as a legitimate governmental function, but have contracted out such duties to
independent contractors.
The line separating these two positions in terms of responsibilities and rights is non-distinct.
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import of Rutan, the circuits that have addressed this issue have refused to
extend the same first amendment protection to independent contractors who lose
government contracts because of their political affiliations." Prior to the Rutan
decision, appellate courts refused to afford constitutional protection to
independent contractors based upon the argument that first amendment rights are
more attenuated and insufficient since public contractors are only being deprived
of 'one customer" due to the patronage practice, and can find other contracts

However, although there exists a great number of non-public employment positions that contract with
the government, the independent contractors referred to throughout the text of this note and who
deserve equal constitutional protection could be categorized as performing "closely-related" jobs,
i.e., jobs that are closely related to legitimate government functions that have been or could be
performed by government employees. The rationale for this focus is that the government should not
be allowed to relegate work performed by constitutionally protected government employees to
independent contractors who are uninsulated from political patronage. Similarly, the government
should not be able to eschew performing certain jobs by contracting them out just so they can
practice party politics. The rights implicated by denying public contracts are those of the individual
involved who suffers a termination or rejection of a public contract for a particular job, just like
those public employees who lose their particular position.
It follows that the parties identified as "independent contractors" who are suggested to be
deserving of the same first amendment protections as government employees focus on the individuals
involved whose rights are infringed upon. Thus, the independent contractors focused on for the
purposes of this note do not include large corporations such as General Dynamics whose jobs are
outside the realm of traditional governmental undertakings. In other words, this note is concerned
only with independent contractors who have been terminated or rejected from contracts for activities
such as towing, sewage, waste treatment, custodial work, inspection, other municipal duties, etc.,
but not with contracts for building airplanes or tanks which are outside the realm of those traditional
jobs the government performs itself. This is not to say that similar rights are not implicated in these
large corporations, or that they are less deserving of constitutional protections. An exhaustive list
of which jobs and contracts are included herein is nearly impossible to compile due to the numerous
functions of the government at federal, state, county, and local levels. The focus of this note is on
the parallel individual rights existing between government employees and independent contractors
as limited above. The difference between employees and contractors may be one of autonomy in
the performance of the job, but this does not implicate a lesser right to receive a government benefit.
For further discussion on independent contractors and political patronage, see infra section V, notes
111-64 and accompanying text.
10. See Downtown Auto Parks, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 938 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the First Amendment did not forbid the city from considering the party's adverse
lobbying efforts when it refused to renew parking lot leases), cen. denied, 112 S. Ct. 640 (1991);
Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the First
Amendment did not protect contractors in the awarding of public contracts), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
129 (1990); Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc) (holding that motor vehicle agents
were independent contractors rather than public employees and were not insulated by the First
Amendment from being replaced by the governor's successor who was of a different political party);
LaFalce v. Houston, 712 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the First Amendment does not
forbid the city from using political criteria in awarding public contracts), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1044 (1984); Sweeney v. Bond, 669 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that the politically motivated
dismissal of Department of Revenue fee agents, classified as independent contractors, does not
violate the First Amendment), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 878 (1982). Each of these cases is discussed
in turn in greater detail infra in section IV, notes 111-64 and accompanying text.
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elsewhere in the private sector." Since Rutan, the courts have followed
identical logic and relied solely upon the holdings of the pre-Rutan cases. Thus,
the lower federal courts have limited the scope of Elrod and Brand to
government employees, and have refused to expand this protection to
independent contractors absent a clear Supreme Court decision mandating such
an expansion.
In light of the recent extension of constitutional protection from political
patronage in terms of hiring, promotion, transfer, or other opportunity, and in
light of the first amendment freedoms affected by terminating public contracts,
the refusal to further extend this protection to independent contractors warrants
a critical re-evaluation. The lower courts in the various circuits have applied the
Elrod-Branti political patronage doctrines inconsistently and incorrectly by
refusing to include independent contractors within those positions warranting
constitutional protection. Furthermore, the federal courts have failed to apply
the same reasoning of Rutan expanding individual protections, and have
similarly failed to undertake a critical re-evaluation of the first amendment rights
at stake for independent contractors in light of Rutan. As a result, this area is
in need of uniformity and direction, which can be accomplished by extending the
same individual first amendment protections to independent contractors who have
fallen victim to politically motivated public contract terminations.
This Note will initially address the inception and development of the
political patronage doctrine, including the rationales and bases for constitutional
protection. 2 Second, this Note will examine the Supreme Court's treatment
of patronage in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, as well as the first
amendment protections afforded to public employees as a result of the Court's
other patronage decisions.' 3 Third, this Note will scrutinize the lower courts'
general refusal prior to Rutan to extend the same first amendment protections
to independent contractors who lose contracts with the government or
government entities because of their political affiliations or practices. 4 Fourth,
this Note will analyze the current status of the judicial treatment of political
patronage practices affecting independent contractors after Rutan.'5 Finally,
a proposition for extending first amendment protection to independent
contractors will be offered, in light of Rutan and other case law, reflecting a
movement toward increased protections for individual freedoms of
expression.' 6

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See supra note 10; infra notes 114-64 and accompanying text.
See infra section 1I, notes 17-63 and accompanying text.
See infra section IH, notes 64-110 and accompanying text.
See infra section IV, notes 111-53 and accompanying text.
See infra section IV, notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
See infra section V, notes 165-222 and accompanying text.
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II. HisToRicAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW
A. The Tradition of the Practice of PoliticalPatronage
"To the victors belong the spoils." 7 This has been the inherent
philosophy of political officeholders who subscribe to the philosophy of
patronage, which is the allocation of the discretionary favors of government on
the basis of partisan affiliation," in the public employment arena. Such a
philosophy is viewed by some as an appropriate, and in fact, a necessary
political function in order to preserve the political process, the two-party system,
and democracy. 9 Since the inception of the political process in America, the
practice of political patronage has been observed and allowed, although it has
always evoked controversy.'
The spoils system has been entrenched in

17. The origins of this phrase are uncertain, but it has symbolized the philosophy of
government officials who have succeeded to office, and desire to appoint loyal party supporters to
government positions (often referred to as the "spoils system." See Susan Lorde Martin, A Decade
of BrantiDecisions: A Government Official's Guide to PatronageDismissals, 39 AM. U. L. REV.
11 (1989) (presenting an elaborate discussion of patronage historically and in the individual circuit
courts, and proposing an appropriate course of action for newly elected government officials who
desire to replace employees of the political opposition with their own supporters); GALES AND
SEATON'S REGISTER OF DEBATES IN CONGRESS (Jan. 1832) (statement of Sen. Marcy).
18. MARTIN TOLCHIN & SUSAN TOLCHIN, To THE VICTOR 5-6, 323 (1971). See also Bryan
A. Schneider, Comment, Do Not Go Gentle into that Good Mght: The Unquiet Death of Polidcal
Patronage, 1992 WIs. L. REV. 511 (1992) (tracing the elaborate history and origin of political
patronage in America and proposing a method for correctly applying the Supreme Court's precedents
from Elrod through Rutan to public employment situations). Patronage has similarly been defined
as "[t]he power to appoint to office or grant other favors, especially political ones." WEBSTER'S
NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1315 (2d ed. 1980).
19. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 368 (1976); Rutanv. Republican Party of Illinois,
110 S. Ct. 2729, 2746 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Elrod, the petitioners stressed that
supporting patronage dismissals is necessary to preserve the democratic process. According to the
petitioners, "[W]e have contrived no system for the support of a party that does not place
considerable reliance on patronage. The party organization makes a democratic government work
and charges a price for its services." Elrod, 427 U.S. at 368 n.21 (citing Brief for Petitioners 43
(quoting V. KEY, POLTICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 369 (5th ed. 1964))).
Similarly, Justice Scalia, in a vigorous dissent in Rutan, hailed the necessity of the patronage
system to maintain a stable democracy. Scalia relied on Justice Powell's dissent in Elrod in stating:
"[P]atronage stabilizes political parties and prevents excessive political fragmentation-both of which
are results in which States have a strong governmental interest. Party strength requires the efforts
of the rank-and-file... to perform such tasks as organizing precincts, registering new voters, and
providing constituent services." Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2752-53 (citing Elrod, 427 U.S. at 385).
20. Patronage practices have been traced back to Thomas Jefferson's presidency, although its
popularization and legitimization primarily occurred later in the presidency of Andrew Jackson.
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 353. See also C. FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 87, 209-10
(1904); D. ROSENBLOOM, FEDERAL SERVICE AND THE CONSTITUTION 238-40 (1971), for a more
detailed discussion of the history of the patronage doctrine.
Nevertheless, this practice evoked much congressional disapproval and battles between
Congress and President Andrew Jackson. In fact, after Jackson's administration, strong discontent
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American history for almost two hundred years,21 and for most of that period
it was assumed, without serious question or debate, that because public
employees have no constitutional right to a job, there could be no valid
constitutional objection to their removal.'
Political patronage continued uncurbed until the Supreme Court, in Elrod
v. Burns,' held for the first time that political party affiliation is not a
sufficient basis for the discharge of public employees, and violates the
employees' rights of speech and association under the First Amendment.'

with the corruption and inefficiency of the patronage system resulted in the Pendleton Act. See infra
note 23. Also, ironically, at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the political party system
itself was far from an accepted political norm. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2741 (1990) (Stevens, I.,
concurring). Political scholars of that time, such as Jonathan Swift, proffered the maxim "[plarty
is the madness of many, for the gain of the few," and John Adams believed that "a division of the
republic into two great parties . . . is to be dreaded as the greatest political evil under our
Constitution." Id.
Conversely, George Washington Plunkitt, a firm advocate of the patronage system stated:
I ain't up on sillygisms [sic], but I can give you some arguments nobody can
answer. First, this great and glorious country was built upon by political parties; second
parties can't hold together if their workers don't get offices when they win; third, if the
parties go to pieces, the government they built up must go to pieces, too; fourth, then
there'll be hell to pay.
W. RIORDIN, PLUNKrT OF TAMMANY HALL 13 (1963), quoted in Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2747 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
21. See Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482, 483 (2d Cir. 1971) (upholding a city employee's
discharge solely for failing to switch her political party because her position was not protected and
"the plain hard fact is that so far as the Constitution is concerned there is no prohibition against the
dismissal of Government employees because of their political beliefs, activities, or affiliations.")
(quoting Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (U.S. App. D.C. 1950)). The court noted that although
civil service laws have ameliorated the devastating effects that the spoils system can have on the
government, because of the longstanding tradition of patronage in the public employment realm, the
victors will still reap the harvest of those public positions still exempt from civil service laws. Id.
at 483-84.
22. See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affid, 341 U.S. 918 (1951)
(upholding the denial to reinstate a federal worker because of alleged affiliations with the Communist
party which led the government to believe she was disloyal). See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972), discussed at infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
23. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). This case and its progeny (Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980),
and Rutan v. Republican Party of illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990)) are discussed in greater detail,
infra notes 24-51 and accompanying text. However, as a result of the Pendleton Act, Act of Jan.
16, 1883, c. 27, § 2(2) Fifth, Sixth, 22 Stat. 404, and the implementation of merit systems for
public employees in the early 1800s, unbridled patronage had been displaced to some extent. Elrod,
427 U.S. at 354. The Court acknowledged, nevertheless, that "[tihe decline of patronage
employment is not, of course, relevant to the question of its constitutionality. It is the practice itself,
not the magnitude of its occurrence, the constitutionality of which must be determined." Id.
24. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1976). The Court initially noted that freedom of
association for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is protected by the First as
well as the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Under the theory of selective incorporation, provisions of
the Bill of Rights that the Supreme Court deems fundamental are applied to the states through the
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Specifically, the Court held that political belief, expression, and association are
Thus, the
within those core activities protected by the First Amendment.'
Court concluded that the threat of dismissal for failing to support a particular
political party inhibits the protected belief and association, and penalizes their
exercise by denying the receipt of a government benefit.' While acknowledging the importance of these individual rights, the Elrod Court created an
exception allowing patronage dismissals for public positions which inherently
However, the lines distinguishing
involved "policymaking" duties.'
policymaking positions, where party affiliation and political loyalty are necessary
for the implementation of policies, from nonpolicymaking positions were
unclearly drawn and broadly construed in Elrod, thus perpetuating the potential

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §10.2, at 332 (4th ed. 1991). All the provisions of the First Amendment
concerning freedom of speech have been held applicable to the states. Id. See Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Thus, if a state were to abridge the
freedom of speech, it would be abridging the First Amendment as applied to it through the
Fourteenth Amendment. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra, at 332. For the purposes of this note, the
first amendment concerns will be referred to as applicable to the states and addressed as such, rather
than addressing fourteenth amendment implications. Further, potential due process liberty interests
under the Fourteenth Amendment in the patronage area are beyond the scope of this note.
25. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356. The Court noted that although freedom of belief is central, the
First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression. Id. at 357.
26. Id. at 359-60. The Court relied heavily on three cases in concluding that patronage
conditions the receipt of a public benefit upon pledging allegiance to a political party and inhibits
free exercise: Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (invalidating New York statutes
barring employment merely on the basis of membership in "subversive" organizations, holding that
political association alone could not constitute an adequate ground for denying public employment
and was inconsistent with the First Amendment); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)
(holding that a state college professor had a first amendment claim if the state's refusal to renew his
contract was the result of his public criticisms of the school board's policies, thus rejecting
limitations on first amendment rights as a condition to the receipt of a governmental benefit); and
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (holding that denying public benefits to a person because
of his constitutionally protected speech or association would inhibit and penalize those freedoms).
Id. These cases are discussed further at infra notes 75, 78, 109 and accompanying text.
27. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 359-60. It has been noted by William Luneburg that:
The restrictions that have been imposed on patronage practices under Elrod and its
progeny help assure that, when intragovernmental debate does occur, there may be a
greater diversity of views expressed than would be the case if various tests of political
loyalty could be imposed in structuring the composition of the public workforce. The
"policymaking" position exception to Elrod, however, should be very narrowly limited
to control its erosion of that diversity within the higher levels of policy debate where
such diversity may be essential to a deliberative process capable of taking account of all
significant points of view.
William V. Luneburg, Civic Republicanism, the First Amendment, and Executive Branch
Polcymaking, 43 ADMIN. L. REy. 367 (1991).
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for party nepotism.'
Four years later, Branti v. Finkel' reaffirmed the first amendment ban on
patronage dismissals and revised the "policymaking" criteria. The majority
acknowledged the determination in Elrod that party affiliation may be necessary
for some governmental positions, but concluded that the appropriate inquiry is
"not whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a particular position;
rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the
public office involved."'"
In focusing on the essentiality of party membership to a position to
determine whether the patronage dismissal was justified, the Brand Court
demonstrated that the label "policymaker" is not the touchstone of
constitutionality regarding politically motivated dismissals. 3' Hence, the Court

28. The Court in Elrod specifically acknowledged that "[n]o clear line can be drawn between
policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions." Elrod, 427 U.S. at 368; Lohom v. Michal, 913
F.2d 327, 332 (7th Cir. 1990). The Court further noted that "[w]hile nonpolicymaking individuals
usually have limited responsibility, that is not to say that one with a number of responsibilities is
necessarily in a policymaking position." Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367. The Court stated that the nature
]n
of the responsibilities is critical, and further stated that "[a
employee with responsibilities that are
not well-defined or are of broad scope more likely functions in a policymaking position." Id. at
367-68. Thus, the political loyalty "justification is a matter of proof, or at least argument, directed
at particular kinds of jobs." Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 574 (7th Cir.
1972) (Stevens, J., with Campbell, J., concurring) cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973), quoted in
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367-68. See Lohom, 913 F.2d at 332-35 (acknowledging that no clear line
between policymaking and nonpolicyaking positions can be drawn in a suit for alleged violations
of First Amendment by a Democratic assistant chief of police who was demoted to detective after
a Republican mayor took office, and removing case from summary judgment because the term
"policymaker" was not substantial enough to show that position was inherently policymaking in
nature).
29. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
30. Id. at 518. (Stevens, J., writing for the majority).
31. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. at 518-20. The Court stated that "whatever policymaking occurs
in the public defender's office must relate to the needs of individual clients and not to any partisan
political interest." Id. at 519. In differentiating between party necessity and policymaker, the Court
noted:
It is equally clear that party affiliation is not necessarily relevant to every
policymaking or confidential position. The coach of a state university's football team
formulates policy, but no one could seriously claim that Republicans make better
coaches than Democrats, or vice versa, no matter which party is in control of the state
government. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the Governor of a State may
appropriately believe that the official duties of various assistants who help him write
speeches, explain his views to the press, or communicate with the legislature cannot be
performed effectively unless those persons share his political beliefs and party
commitments.
Id. at 518.
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held that certain high-ranking, policymaking employees, who under Elrod could
have been discharged solely for political reasons, were protected from politically
motivated dismissals. 2 Nevertheless, the case offered further evidence of the
Court's increasing disfavor of political patronage practices and heightened
protection for individuals.
B. First Amendment Concerns and Reasoning by the Court
The Supreme Court, in both Elrod and Branti, concluded that requiring
public employees to pledge their allegiance to a political party imposes
unconstitutional restraints on the freedoms of speech and association. In
determining what impairment patronage practices had on the employees' first
amendment rights, the Court employed a strict scrutiny standard of review to
determine whether the justifications for patronage dismissals outweighed the
infringement on the public employees' constitutional rights.3
The Court
disregarded the interests of the political parties involved,' 4 and instead focused
on whether the government had a vital and compelling interest in practicing
patronage. The Court concluded that only dismissals from positions involving
policymaking or confidential information (Elrod), and later, positions where
party affiliation is essential to job performance (Branti), would pass
constitutional muster to warrant patronage practice.3"

32. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. at 517-19. See also Schneider, supra note 18, at 511.
33. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362, 368 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. at 515-16
(1980) (quoting Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362, 368). The Court acknowledged that it is firmly established
that a significant impairment of first amendment rights triggers a strict scrutiny standard where the
constitutional impairment must survive exacting scrutiny. Erod, 427 U.S. at 362, 368; Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1976); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). Thus,
encroachment of these rights cannot be justified upon a mere showing of a legitimate state interest;
the interest advanced must be paramount and of vital importance, and the burden is on the
government to show the existence of such an interest. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58, 59
(1973). Relying on this, the Elrod plurality expressly declined to apply a 'rational relation" test
where the government merely needs to show that the government's conduct was rationally related
to a legitimate governmental interest. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362-63. When the government
significantly impairs a person's first amendment rights, the Court set forth that the government must
show a compelling government interest that is "of vital importance," the "gain to the subordinating
interest provided by the means must outweigh the incurred loss of protected rights," and the
government must "employ means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment." Id.
34. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362. The Court determined that "care must be taken not to confuse the
interest of partisan organizations with governmental interests. Only the latter will suffice." Id.
Justice Powell's dissent argued that the interests of the parties involved were important, and that the
distinction between what is beneficial for the parties and for the government is flawed. Id. at 383
(Powell, J., dissenting). See S. Jay Dobbs, Elected Officials Can no Longer Reward Supporters
With Jobs... or Can They? 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 925, 928-30 (Fall, 1991), discussed at infra note
167.
35. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362, 367; Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. at 516-18.
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The important individual rights that patronage dismissals violate are the
rights of freedom of speech and freedom to associate under the First
Amendment. In the absence of a compelling government interest, individual
rights are paramount, and warrant protection. 6 The premise behind facilitating
public speech, especially speech that is political in nature, stems from a series
of cases involving the advocacy of illegal action, 37 and has been attributed to
Justice Holmes' "marketplace of ideas" theory, which supposes that competition
of the market is the best test of truth.3 This position reflects our "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 9
This principle is itself reflective of the fundamental understanding that
"[c]ompetition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral
process."'
Similarly, speech that is political in nature fosters healthy
criticisms of the government that ultimately keeps its power in check and
maintains a balanced democracy. The courts have placed free debate regarding
political issues on "the highest rung of the hierarchy of first amendment
values.""' Thus, to the extent that it compels or restrains belief and speech,
especially that which is political in nature, patronage is inconsistent with the
basic tenets of the First Amendment.

36. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362.
37. See generally Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
38. Justice Holmes' "marketplace of ideas" model originated in his dissent in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), in which he stated:
mhe ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution .... [W]e should be eternally
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loath and believe
to be fraught with death . . . [Only] the emergency which makes it immediately
dangerous to leave the correction of evil warrants counsels to time making any exception
to the sweeping command, "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech."
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). According to the
marketplace of ideas theory, speech in the public arena will be rebutted or supported by more
speech, which will ultimately determine the truthfulness or falsity of the propounded speech; and
thus, such public expressive speech warrants first amendment protection.
39. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
40. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
41. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980). See also RedLion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (addressing first amendment freedom of speech rights in the broadcast
arena, noting that "[it] is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace
of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that
market" by the government or other individuals).
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In terms of the speech and belief rights at stake in public employment
cases, it is necessary to distinguish between cases involving public employee
"passive" political beliefs and freedoms to support or not support a particular
candidate or party, from employee speech that "actively" criticizes or comments
on governmental policymaking or political beliefs. In the former situation, the
employee's speech is protected under the First Amendment and triggers a strict
scrutiny standard of review requiring a compelling governmental interest.42 In
the latter situation, the public employee's speech is protected under the First
Amendment, but that protection is limited to "matters of public concern. " '
Internal government personnel matters or disgruntled employee criticisms of the
government do not meet this criteria, and the government is given greater
deference to regulate the employee's speecl. 4 Public employees may speak
their minds publicly or privately on issues relevant to governmental
policymaking, but the speech will be unprotected if it is deemed "materially
disruptive" of the workplace environment.45
This latter principle was at issue in Connick v. Myers," where the Court
held that "when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public
concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest" the
federal courts are not in a position to review the wisdom of a personnel decision
based on that employee's behavior. 47 Similarly, Rankin v. McPherson'
suggests that public employee open speech is protected by the First Amendment,
but unlike the "speech" in Elrod, the interests of the State in efficiency of

42. See supra note 33.
43. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983), discussed at infra notes 46-51 and
accompanying text.
44. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). See also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S.
378 (1987); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), discussed at infra notes 45-51
and accompanying text.
45. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (finding that office talk critical of the state
office interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise and impairs harmonious conditions
among co-workers), at infra notes 48-49; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (discharge of
assistant district attorney for objecting to office policy and questionnaire did not offend the First
Amendment), at infra notes 46-47; Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (dismissal
of a public school teacher for sending a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the Board of Education
did not present a first amendment claim). Both Rankin and Connick follow the decision of
Pickering, which specifically set forth that "[tlhe problem in any case is to arrive at a balance
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and
the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees." Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. at 568.
46. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
47. Id. at 138. The determination of whether a public employee's speech addresses a matter
of public concern is to be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement as
revealed by the whole record. Id.
48. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
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operation take on increased weight.49 Thus, in contrast to the cases involving
Elrod-type speech, which demonstrate a particularly high degree of first
amendment protection, cases in this latter category display less solicitude for the
interest in freedom of speech of public employees. 5° This distinction between
Elrod-type political speech and Connick-type political speech is based on the
premise that merely holding certain political beliefs will create much less of a
threat to legitimate governmental interests than would overt expression of those
beliefs in the workplace. 5'
Another significant first amendment right implicated by political patronage
is that of freedom of association. A government employee who is a member of
the out-party 2 is forced to maintain affiliation and association with the outparty, thereby risking the loss of a government job.53 The financial and
campaign assistance that the employee is induced to provide to another party
"furthers the advancement of that party's policies to the detriment of his party's
views and ultimately his own beliefs, and any assessment of his salary is
tantamount to coerced belief. "'" The First Amendment guarantees the right to
think and associate free from governmental interference, and protects "the right
of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority" and refuse to
foster a view they find objectionable.55 It follows that the First Amendment
protects political association as well as political expression.'
This is
confirmed by NAACP v. Button,57 which stated, "There can no longer be any
doubt that freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of
political beliefs and ideas is a form of 'orderly group activity' protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendment."' Further, the right to associate with the

49. Id. at 388-91.
50. Luneburg, supra note 27.
51. Id. at 367. Further, officers and employees within the administrative bureaucracy can speak
their minds publicly or privately on issues relevant to government policymaking, but only at the
substantial risk that the court may deem that speech unduly disruptive of the workplace environment.
Id.
52. The term "out-party" refers to affiliation with the opposing or other party who is not
dominant or the party in control (e.g., a Republican government employee who works for a newly
elected Democrat Mayor would not be in the dominant party and thus, would be in the "out-party").
53. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355 (1976). See also Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,
191-92 (1952) (holding that a state statute requiring a broad loyalty oath as a condition of
employment violated public employee's first and fourteenth amendment rights of free association).
54. Id. at 355; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
55. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that requiring a state resident to display
the motto on his license plates violated his first amendment right not to be associated with particular
ideas and right not to speak).
56. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 11.
57. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
58. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 430. See also Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
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political party of one's choice is an integral part of these basic constitutional
freedoms,59 thus warranting protection from pressure or coercion to pledge
allegiance to the dominant political party.
Ironically, the same first amendment protections of speech and association
from political patronage practices have not been extended to encompass
independent contractors who have been terminated from public contracts for
partisan political reasons.' The courts that have addressed this concern have
suggested that one reason not to protect contractors, though arguably weak, is
that the coerciveness associated with public employees carries diminished weight
when an independent contractor simply loses one "customer" due to
patronage.6 ' Consequently, an independent contractor would feel a lesser sense
of dependency if it lost a government contract than an employee losing a
government job.' Because of this, first amendment rights are more attenuated
and insufficient to trigger strict scrutiny and to justify interfering with political
institutions.' Such rationale, however, neglects to incorporate the expansive
language and increased protections of individual rights reflected in Rutan and

59. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973). This is correlative to the principle
espoused in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word
or act their faith therein." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(upholding the right of public school students to refuse to salute flag).
60. See Downtown Auto Parks, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 938 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the First Amendment did not forbid the city from considering party's adverse lobbying
efforts when it refused to renew parking lot leases), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 640 (1991), discussed
at infra notes 154-64; Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1989)
(holding that the First Amendment did not protect contractors in the awarding of public contracts),
cer. denied, 111 S. Ct. 129 (1990), discussed at infra notes 144-46; Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668
(3d Cir. 1986) (holding that motor vehicle agents were independent contractors rather than public
employees and were not insulated by the First Amendment from being replaced by the governor's
successor who was of a different political party), discussed at infra notes 131-43 and accompanying
text; LaFalce v. Houston, 712 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the First Amendment does not
forbid the city to use political criteria in awarding public contracts), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1044
(1984), discussed at infra notes 121-30 and accompanying text; Sweeney v. Bond, 669 F.2d 542 (8th
Cir. 1982) (holding that politically motivated dismissal of Department of Revenue fee agents,
classified as independent contractors, does not violate the First Amendment), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
878 (1982), discussed at infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the validity of patronage in the context of
independent contractors or other non-government employees. The courts that have addressed this
issue are all lower federal courts who have relied on earlier precedent, and have refused to extend
the principles espoused in Elrod and Brand outside of the public "employment" arena, and are
content to leave this issue for the Supreme Court to resolve.
61. Triad, 892 F.2d at 583. See also Horn, 796 F.2d at 668; LaFalce, 712 F.2d at 292;
Sweeney, 669 F.2d at 542, discussed at infra notes 114-64 and accompanying text.
62. Horn, 796 F.2d at 674-75. See also Triad, 892 F.2d at 583.
63. Horn, 796 F.2d at 674-75.
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fails to address those same basic rights in the context of independent contractors.
Furthermore, this reasoning fails to capture the spirit and intent of the decisions
of the Elrod-Branti-Rutantrilogy. These shortcomings will be examined more
critically in subsequent sections.
III.
A.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PATRONAGE PRACTICES

The Inception of Legal Limits on the Practice of Political Patronage

In 1976, in Elrod v. Burns," the Supreme Court addressed the claim of
several governmental employees alleging that they were discharged for partisan
reasons. 5 In Elrod, Republican non-civil service employees of a county
sheriff's office commenced this action when they were discharged or threatened
with discharge after a Democratic sheriff was elected. They asserted that they
were discharged or threatened with discharge based solely on their refusal to
affiliate or sponsor the Democratic party, which violated their first amendment
rights.' The Court concluded for the first time that the dismissed employees
had a legally cognizable claim for deprivation of their constitutional rights as
secured by the First Amendment.67
The Court addressed three specific areas in determining whether patronage
unconstitutionally infringed upon the employees' rights: the restraints patronage
places on freedoms of belief and association; the role of patronage as acting to
deny or condition the receipt of a government benefit to persons in detriment to
their rights; and the validity of competing governmental interests in allowing
patronage in the employment arena. I
The Elrod Court noted that "political belief and association constitute the
core of those activities protected by the First Amendment."69 The Court
concluded that the dismissals violated the employees' first amendment rights of

64.
65.
66.
67.

427 U.S. 347 (1976).
Id.at 353.
Id. at 350-51.
Id. at 349-50. Elrod has been viewed by Susan Lorde Martin as a logical expansion of

what was a growing trend increasing the rights of government workers: "In 1952 the Supreme
Court first recognized that individuals retain certain constitutional rights even though they are
employed by the government.' Martin, supra note 17, at 18; see also Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183 (1952); supra note 53 and accompanying text. She went on to state: "Over the next
twenty years, the Court gradually expanded the first amendment protection to which public
employees were entitled. Viewed in the context of the Court's doctrinal progression, Elrod seems
but one more step in the expansion of religious, speech, and associational rights that government

workers enjoy. Martin, supra note 17, at 18; see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972),
and Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); supra note 26 and accompanying text.
68. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355-70, 373-75 (1976).
69. Id. at 356.
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free speech and association, and identified two separate but interrelated reasons
to support this conclusion. First, the Court stated that the inevitable tendency
of a political patronage system is to improperly coerce employees into
compromising their true political beliefs.' In effect, "the individual's ability
to act according to his beliefs and to associate with others of his political
persuasion is constrained, and support for his party is diminished. "7
Second, not only are the individual beliefs and associational freedoms
impaired, but the free functioning of the electoral process also suffers.'
Conditioning public employment on partisan support prevents support of
competing political interests, tips the electoral process in favor of the incumbent
party, and significantly impacts the political process.'
Thus, the Court
concluded that patronage, to the extent that it compels or restrains belief and
association, is inimical to the process that underlies our system of government
and is "at war74 with the deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First
Amendment."

The Court next determined that the government may not deny a benefit to
a person on a basis that infringes upon constitutionally protected interests,
especially interest in freedom of speech.7' The Court stated that a political
patronage system has such an effect by imposing an unconstitutional condition
on the receipt of a public benefit.76 Under the patronage practice, public
employees hold their jobs on the condition that they provide, in some acceptable
manner, support for the favored political party, and subsequent dismissal for
failure to provide such support unquestionably penalizes its exercise."

70. Id. at 355.
71. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 355-56. The Court reasoned that this is because the average public
employee is required to support the opposing party in terms of financial and campaign assistance.
Because the average employee is hardly in the financial position to support his party and another,
or lend his time to two parties, pledging allegiance to the party in charge restricts, if not eliminates,
his loyalty and support to his true political party and ideology. Id.
72. Id. at 356.
73. Id. at 356-57.
74. Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 576 (7th Cir. 1972), quoted in
Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976).
75. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 357; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (prohibiting the
refusal of the state to renew a state college teacher's contract in response to his public criticisms of
the board of education's policies); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 687 (1967)
(invalidating New York statutes barring employment merely on the basis of membership in
subversive organizations); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (holding that the First
Amendment prohibits limiting the grant of a tax exemption to only those who affirm their loyalty
to the State granting the exemption).
76. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 357-59. See also Shafer, supra note 5, at § 2 (surveying and
summarizing the treatment of various patronage claims at different governmental positions by the
Supreme Court, federal circuit courts, and state courts).
77. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 359.
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Further, the Court stated that even though a person has no "right" to a valuable
governmental benefit, and the government may deny the benefit for any number
of reasons, promoting party interests in the employment context is one reason
upon which the government may not rely.'
Upon determining that political patronage offends the public employees'
first amendment rights, thus triggering strict scrutiny, the Court assessed the
interests of the government in allowing patronage in the workplace. The Court
ultimately rejected the government's interests of efficiency, employee loyalty,
and the preservation of the democratic process in practicing patronage,' with
the notable exception for those employees who were in a "policymaking" or
"confidential" position.' The Court conceded that there was a vital need for
government efficiency and effectiveness, but concluded that political patronage
dismissals are not the least restrictive means for fostering that end, and therefore
are unconstitutional."'
In 1980, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Elrod in Brand v. Finkel,'
holding that a Democratic public defender's requirement that his assistant public
defenders obtain Democratic party support in order to retain their employment
offended the First Amendment.'
The Court explained that conditioning
continued public employment on an employee securing support from a particular
political party violates the First Amendment because of "the coercion of belief
that necessarily flows from the knowledge that one must have a sponsor in the
dominant party in order to retain one's job."" Furthermore, the Brand Court
broadened the individual protections of Elrod further by stating that dismissed
employees need not actually prove that they, or any other employees, have been
coerced into changing, either actually or ostensibly, their political allegiance.'

78. Id. at 360-61. The Court further quoted Keyishian v. Board of Regents, recognizing such
impermissible reasons: "The denial of a public benefit may not be used by the government for the
purpose of creating an incentive enabling it to achieve what it may not command directly."
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. at 605-06.
79. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 366-69 (1976).
80. Id. at 367.
The plurality recognized that the line between policymaking and
nonpolicyaking positions is a fine one, but identified that factors of the number and nature of the
employee's responsibilities, and whether the employee acts as an advisor or assists in the
implementation of broad governmental goals, may be relevant considerations in determining whether

the position is policymaking in nature. Id. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
81. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 372-73.
82. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 507, 516.
85. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. at 517. The Court rejected petitioner's argument that Elrod
should be read to prohibit only dismissals resulting from "an employee's failure to capitulate to
political coercion." Id. at 516. This argument was premised on the proposal that so long as an
employee is not asked to change his political affiliation or contribute to the party's candidates, he
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In order to prevail, public employees need only show that they were discharged
because they were not affiliated with or sponsored by a particular party."
The Court in Branti also observed, as in Elrod, that in some circumstances
a position of public employment may be conditioned on party affiliation, but
acknowledged that it is not always easy to determine whether a position is one
for which political affiliation is a legitimate factor for consideration."
However, in determining this, the Branti Court shifted the focus of positions
where party affiliation is necessary from that set forth in Elrod. The Court
concluded that the appropriate test is not whether the label "policymaker" or
"confidential" fits a particular position, but rather "whether the hiring authority
can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the
effective performance of the public office involved. '
The effect of this
modification narrows the range of positions that can validly use party affiliation
as a necessary criterion in hiring or dismissal, and only allows patronage
practices in those positions that are inherently political in nature and require
affiliation for the effective performance and implementation of governmental
policies.
B. FurtherExtension of FirstAmendment Protectionfrom PoliticalPatronage:
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided the monumental case of Rutan v.
Republican Party of Illinois," completing the trilogy of patronage cases. In
Rutan, former and present low-level public employees and an employment
applicant brought an action challenging the Governor of Illinois' use of political

may be dismissed with impunity. The Court rejected this contention and stated that although "it
would perhaps eliminate the more blatant forms of coercion described in Elrod," it would not
eliminate the inherent coercive effects of being in the out-party and not having a sponsor in the
dominant party. Id.
86. Brani, 445 U.S. at 517.
87. Id. at 517-18.
88. Id. at 518. The Court opined that under some circumstances, a position may be
appropriately considered political even though it is neither policymaking nor confidential in nature.
Id. at 518-19. As an example, the Court offered:
[I]f a State's election laws require that precincts be supervised by two election judges
of different parties, a Republican judge could be legitimately discharged solely for
changing his political party registration. That conclusion would not depend on any
finding that the job involved participation in policy decisions or access toconfidential
information. Rather, it would simply rest on the fact that party membership was
essential to the discharge of the employee's governmental responsibilities.
Id. at 518.
89. 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990). Ruta= was a five-four decision, with Justice Brennan writing the
majority opinion.
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The Supreme Court
considerations in hiring, transferring, and promoting.'
rejected an argument by the respondents that Elrod and Branti were inapplicable
because the patronage dismissals at issue in those cases were different from a
failure to promote, transfer, or recall after layoff.91 In doing so, the Court
rejected the respondents' argument that the employees' rights had not been
infringed because they had no right to promotion, transfer, or rehire.' 2 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court acknowledged that it had rejected such an
argument in both Elrod and Branti, and quoted Perry v. Sindermann: 3
[E]ven though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental
benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for
any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the
government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially,
his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny
a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech
or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be
penalized and inhibited.

..

. Such interference with constitutional

rights is impermissible.9
The Rutan Court ultimately concluded that the same first amendment
concerns that were present in Elrod and Branti were implicated here: patronage
imposes restraints on individual freedoms of speech and association; patronage
penalizes the receipt of a government benefit to the detriment of constitutionally
protected rights; and the government interests in efficiency, effectiveness, and
the preservation of the democratic process do not outweigh the burdens of
patronage on first amendment freedoms. First, patronage in these contexts chills
the exercise of political belief and association of the employee, which constitute
the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment. 95 Employees of
the out-party will feel a significant obligation to support political positions held

90. Id. at 2729-30. GovernorThompson issued an executive order on November 12, 1980, that
imposed a hiring freeze on positions within his administration subject to his control. In order to
implement the order, the Governor's Office had looked at whether the applicant voted in Republican
primaries in past election years, whether the applicant had provided financial or other support to the
Republican Party and its candidates, whether the applicant had promised to join and work for the
Republican Party in the future, and whether the applicant had the support of Republican party
officials at state or local levels. Id. at 2732.
91. Rutan, 1IOS. Ct. at 2735.
92. Id.
93. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Perry held that a state college professor had a first amendment claim
if the state's refusal to review his contract was the result of his public criticism of the school board's
policies. Id. at 593. Further, the professor's lack of a contractual or tenure right to re-employment
was determined to be immaterial of his first amendment claim. Id. at 596-98.
94. Id. at 597; Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2735-36 (1990).
95. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2734, 2736.
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by their superiors, and they will refrain from following the political views that
they themselves hold in order to progress up the career ladder."
Second, patronage in the form of denying promotion, transfer, or recall
serves to deny a government benefit on the basis of constitutionally protected
activities.' The Court believed that employees who do not compromise their
beliefs and support the party in charge stand to lose "the considerable increases
in pay and job satisfaction attendant to promotions, the hours and maintenance
expenses that are consumed by long daily commutes, and even their jobs if they
are not rehired after a 'temporary' layoff."" These are significant penalties
and are imposed for the exercise of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
Third, the Court concluded that these patronage practices impermissibly
encroach on the first amendment freedoms of public employees and are not
narrowly tailored to further vital government interests.'
As in Elrod, the
Rutan Court determined that the government's interest in securing effective
employees can be met by discharging, demoting, or transferring staff members
whose work is deficient.m
Likewise, the preservation of the democratic
process is no more furthered by the patronage promotions, transfers, and rehires
at issue than it is by patronage dismissals.''
In fact, it detrimentally impairs
the elective process by discouraging free political expression by public
employees. 2
In holding that promotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on
political affiliation or support are impermissible infringements on the first

96. Id. at 2736. The Court rejected petitioner's argument that the employment decisions at
issue did not violate the First Amendment because the decisions were not punitive, did not adversely
affect the terms of employment, and therefore, did not chill the exercise of protected belief and
association of public employees. Id. The Court set forth that employees who find themselves in
dead-end positions due to their political backgrounds are adversely affected. Id. Similarly,
employees denied transfers to workplaces close to their homes until they join the dominant party
"will feel a daily pressure from their long commutes to do so." Id. Also, employees who have
been laid off will feel "compelled to engage in whatever political activity is necessary to regain
regular paychecks and positions corresponding to their skill and experience." Id.
97. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2736.
98. Id.
99. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2736-37 (1990).
100. Id. at 2737. In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 365-66 (1976), the Court recognized the
government interest in employee effectiveness and efficiency, but concluded that the government can
ensure this through the less drastic means of discharging staff members whose work is inadequate.
101. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2737. See also Elrod, 427 U.S. at 372-73, where the Court rejected
respondents' argument that political patronage dismissals furthered the "preservation of the
democratic process" and nurtured the two-party system by facilitating the effective implementation
of government policies.
102. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2736-37.
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amendment rights of public employees, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the
presumption that only those employment decisions that are the "substantial
equivalent of a dismissal" violate a public employee's rights under the First
Amendment. "m Even though denial of promotion, transfer, or recall are
deprivations less harsh than dismissal, they nevertheless pressure government
employees to conform their beliefs and associations to some state-selected
orthodoxy. t 4
In using strict scrutiny, requiring a vital or compelling
government interest to override the individuals' rights, the Court determined that
the governmental benefits of political patronage cannot be thought to outweigh
its coercive effects."t5
Similarly, patronage hiring places burdens on free speech and association
comparable to those imposed by patronage promotions, transfers, and
recalls. " The Court acknowledged that a state job is valuable, provides
regular paychecks and other benefits, and there may be openings with the state
when business in the private sector is slow."t° Additionally, the government
may be the major, or the only, source of employment. Thus, the Court opined
that "denial of a state job is a serious privation.""° The burden of the loss
of a job opportunity for failure to compromise one's convictions is
unquestionably of such magnitude to state a constitutional claim. '° The Court
found no vital government interest in basing hiring practices on patronage, for

103. Id. at 2737. The "substantial equivalent of a dismissal" constitutional standard by which
to measure alleged patronage practices in government employment was proposed by the Seventh

Circuit. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 868 F.2d 943, 954-57 (7th Cir. 1989). The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reasoned that "rejecting an employment application does not

impose a hardship upon an employee comparable to the loss of [a] job." Id. at 954 (citing Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion)). The Supreme Court rejected this
proffered test by the Seventh Circuit and rejected the applicability of Wygant to the question at issue

in the present case. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2739 (1990).
104. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2737; West Virginia Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943). The Court went on to state that the First Amendment is not a tenure provision that
protects public employees from actual or constructive discharge. Rather, the First Amendment

prevents the government from wielding its power to interfere with its employees' freedom to believe
and associate, or not to believe and associate. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2737-38.
105. Id. at 2736-39.
106. Id. at 2738-39.
107. Id. at 2738.
108. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 2738 (1990).
109. Id. (citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (holding that Maryland could not
refuse an appointee a commission for the position of notary public on the ground that he refused to
declare his belief in God, because the oath unconstitutionally invaded his freedom of belief));
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1967) (holding a law affecting appointment
and retention of teachers invalid because it premised employment on an unconstitutional restriction
of political belief and association); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966) (holding invalid a
loyalty oath which was a prerequisite for public employment); Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75, 100 (1947) (holding that the government may not enact a regulation providing that no Republican
shall be appointed to federal office).
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the same reasons it found that the government lacks justification for patronage
promotions, transfers, or recalls."'
IV. POLITICAL

PATRONAGE IN THE ARENA OF
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS

Despite the violations of individual first amendment rights enumerated in
Elrod v. Burns, Branti v. Finkel, and Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
courts have refused to afford the same constitutional protections to independent
contractors who have lost or been denied government contracts."' In light of
the paramount individual interests at stake, it would seem logical to afford the
same first amendment protections to independent contractors, who are ultimately
in a position tantamount to that of a public employee in terms of receiving
government benefits. Termination of a public contract would appear to weigh

110. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2739. Contrary to the majority's firm position finding most
patronage practices to offend the First Amendment, Justice Scalia authored a vigorous dissent Ooined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice O'Connor in part), arguing, in short, that
holding politically motivated promotions, transfers, or recalls to be unconstitutional would inevitably
lead to an unmanageable flood of litigation. Furthermore, Justice Scalia predicted that this flood of
litigation resulting from expanding protections from patronage practices would lead the Court to
reconsider its intrusion into the entire field of political patronage, arguing that the party system is
an inherent part of political history. Id. at 2758-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, no such flood
has occurred as of present.
Justice Scalia even went so far as to say that the majority's holding that the "governmental
benefits of patronage cannot reasonably be thought to outweigh its 'coercive' effects," reflects a
.naive vision of politics and an inadequate appreciation of the systematic effects of patronage in
promoting stability and facilitating the social and political integration of previously powerless
groups." Id. at 2752 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Further, Scalia asserted that a strict scrutiny standard
of review was not appropriate in patronage cases, but rather a lower level of scrutiny should be
used, and ultimately suggested that Elrod and Branti were incorrectly decided initially. Id. at
2749-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. See Downtown Auto Parks, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 938 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the First Amendment did not forbid the city from considering party's adverse lobbying
efforts when it refused to renew parking lot leases), cen. denied, 112 S. Ct. 640 (1991), discussed
at infra notes 154-64; Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1989),
(holding that the First Amendment did not protect contractors in the awarding of public contracts),
cer. denied, 111 S. Ct. 129 (1990), discussed at infra notes 144-46; Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668
(3d Cir. 1986) (en banc) (holding that motor vehicle agents were independent contractors rather than
public employees and were not insulated by the First Amendment from being replaced by the
governor's successor who was of a different political party), discussed at infra notes 131-43 and
accompanying text; LaFalce v. Houston, 712 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the First
Amendment does not forbid the city to use political criteria in awarding public contracts), ceri.
denied, 464 U.S. 1044 (1984), discussed at infra notes 121-30 and accompanying text; Sweeney v.
Bond, 669 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that politically motivated dismissal of Department of
Revenue fee agents, classified as independent contractors, does not violate the First Amendment),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 878 (1982), discussed at infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
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equally with dismissal from a public position when based on political
affiliation. 12

More readily apparent is that independent contractors, whose rights of
belief and association have been encroached upon by politically motivated
contract terminations, should not be forced to comply or associate with the
political views of the dominant governmental party in order to receive the same
benefits and warrant the same protections as employees who are denied
promotion, transfer, or recall for patronage reasons. Similarly, the protection
of public employees from party practices in hiring should equate equally to

112. The government has often used the independent contractor as a way to allow political
patronage for certain positions while circumventing the constitutionally protected rights of
employees. Unfortunately, the federal courts have supported this distinction and policy practice by
simply categorizing certain government functions as independent contractors, and thus warranting
no constitutional protection. This approach is in itself somewhat flawed since there are several
similarities between public employees and contractors, as defined at supra note 9, in performing
governmental functions.
Often, governmental functions contracted out to private contractors carry with them attached
responsibility and affiliation as an "employee" of the government. This can be seen generally in
the context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Federal Tort Claims Act. Title VII
protects against discrimination of employees, but this does not always exclude independent
contractors. The court in Mathis v. StandardBrands Chem. Indus. established guidelines by which
the plaintiff, who performed industrial waste removal under contract could be deemed an
.employee" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e(f). 10 FEP (BNA) 295 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
The distinction between employment and an independent contractual affiliation depends on the
"economic realities" of the relationship including salary or wages, as opposed to profits, and the
degree of control by the company over the method and manner of the work performed. Id.
Obviously, this classification varies from contractor to contractor, but the court made clear that the
efforts of a company, or the government for that matter, to classify an employee as an independent
contractor in hope of evading Title VII can be pierced. Id.
Thus, just as employers cannot contract out work in order to discriminate against certain
individuals, the government as an employer should not be able to violate an individual's first
amendment rights by contracting out its work and practicing patronage. Similar to the harms the
First Amendment seeks to protect, Congress intended to cover the full range of workers who may
be subject to the harms Title VII was designed to prevent, and as such, there is no tacit dichotomy
between employees and independent contractors. Ambruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir.
1983); Wesley Kobylak, Annotation, Who is "Employee" as Defined in § 701() of the ivil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 USCS § 2000e(), 72 A.L.R. FED. 522 (1992).
This similarity in treatment between the two parties can be seen also in the context of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 USC § 1346(b). Depending on the amount of control by the
government over the job contracted out, the contracting party may be held to be an "employee."
Annotation, Who are 'Employees" of the United States within the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57
A.L.R.2d 1448 (1984). Further, many contractors work in close contact or directly with public
employees, receive a regular paycheck, and perform regular duties over substantial periods of time.
Similarly, many contractors report directly to government officials who oversee their work and
specify the manner in which it is to be performed. Obviously, the spectrum of contractual
relationships is very broad. However, those positions that were once governmental, or could
effectively be done by the government itself but have been contracted out, warrant protection
tantamount to that afforded to government employees.
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protect independent contractors who are denied their bids on public contracts
because they are not in the "correct" political party. Nevertheless, the federal
courts that have addressed this issue have refused to extend the holdings of
Elrod, Branti, and Rutan to patronage practices outside of the employment
sphere.1 3 The reasoning behind this divergence in treatment will be examined
in light of cases both prior to Rutan in the following section, and subsequent to
Rutan in the section thereafter.
A. Political Patronageand Independent Contractor TerminationsBefore
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois
The first significant case to address the constitutional rights of patronage
practices affecting non-public employees after the Elrod-Branti decisions was
Sweeney v. Bond."4 In Sweeney, plaintiffs were fee agents for the State of
Missouri who alleged that they were dismissed from their positions because of
their political beliefs in violation of the First Amendment." 5 The Eighth
Circuit initially determined that fee agents were not state employees, but rather
more akin to independent contractors." 6 The court was then required to
address whether the protections of Elrod and Branti were applicable to such
non-employees. The Eighth Circuit held that these precedential cases did not
employees are not protected from
apply, and thus, that non-government
7
dismissal based on party affiliation."1
The Sweeney court concluded that the holdings in Elrod and Brand were
limited specifically to the dismissal of public employees for partisan reasons." 8
Specifically, the court relied on the language in Elrod: "Although political
patronage comprises a broad range of activities, we are here concerned only

113. See supra note 111. See also infra notes 114-64 and accompanying text for a full
discussion of the federal circuit courts' treatment of independent contractors.
114. 669 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1982), cen. denied, 459 U.S. 878 (1982).
115. Id. at 544. See also Fox & Co. v. Schoemehl, 671 F.2d 303, 305 (8th Cir. 1982),
discussed at infra note 117, for a similar treatment of independentcontractors by the Eighth Circuit.
116. Sweeney, 669 F.2d at 545. In determining this, the court looked at the factors that the

Department of Revenue does not supervise the daily operation of agents, does not account for fees
collected, does not participate in hiring and firing within the offices, agents pay all of their expenses,
agents pay self-employment tax, and are not members of the state retirement system. Id. at 545-46.
117. Id. at 546. The Eighth Circuit, also in 1982, affirmed Sweeney in Fox, 671 F.2d at 303.
This case held that city auditors hired to audit books and records of the school board were similarly
not "public employees," but rather independent contractors who could be denied auditing contracts
in succeeding years solely based on political affiliations. Id. at 305. The court followed Sweeney

exclusively, and relied completely upon the language used within that case, refusing to extend the
patronage decisions to cases which do not involve public employees. Id. Without discussion, the
court dismissed the claim by the auditors. Id.
118. Sweeney v. Bond, 669 F.2d 542, 545 (8th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
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with the constitutionality of dismissing public employees for partisan
reasons,"" 9 and expressly proclaimed it was not willing to extend the
patronage decisions to cases which did not involve public employees. " Thus,
in dismissing any potential applicability of Elrod and Brand, the Eighth Circuit
never reached the merits of the case, nor did it address any competing interests
between individual rights of speech and association, and overriding governmental
concerns. A categorization of the employees as independent contractors was
apparently enough to distinguish Elrod and Brand and dismiss the validity of any
constitutional claim.
One year later, the Seventh Circuit followed suit in refusing to extend the
Elrod-Branti protections to non-state employees in LaFalce v. Houston.' In
LaFalce, the court held that the First Amendment did not protect a contractor
whose bid for a public contract was rejected solely because the owners of the
contracting business were not political supporters of the mayor. ' " This
conclusion was based, in large part, on what was deemed to be a distinction
between the first amendment interests of "independent contractors" and "public
employees," and on the long history of patronage that was ultimately rejected
by the Elrod-Branti Court."2 The plaintiffs argued that, as with public
employees, independent contractors will similarly be discouraged from
expressing their true political beliefs if the result of doing so may be the loss of
public contracts-they will have an incentive, regardless of their beliefs, to
support incumbents or likely winners financially or in other ways. 11 The
court conceded that this argument has an appealing symmetry, but balked at the
opportunity to analyze its validity and applicability by deferring to the only two
reported cases denying to consider such an argument."z
The LaFalce court further dismissed this appeal by weighing the costs of
further subjecting this country's long-established patronage system to first
amendment scrutiny against the benefits to a contractor's exercise of first

119. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 353 (1976).
120. Sweeney, 669 F.2d at 545.
121. 712 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983), cell. denied, 464 U.S. 1044 (1984).
122. Id. at 293-94.
123. Id. See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. The LaFalce court, however,
propounded that the "practice of favoring political supporters in awarding contracts for public
projects has a long history at the federal and particularly state and local levels." Id. at 293. See
infra note 126.
124. LaFakce, 712 F.2d at 293.
125. Id. at 293-94. The court cited to Sweeney v. Bond, 669 F.2d 542, 545 (8th Cir. 1982),
and Fox & Co. v. Schoemehl, 671 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1982).
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amendment rights.2 6 The Seventh Circuit also acknowledged the apparent
narrow application of the Elrod-Branti doctrine, and concluded that in light of
these factors, the costs of protecting contractors outweighed the benefits of
protecting them: "To attempt to purge government of politics to the extent
implied by an effort to banish partisan influences from public contracting will
strike some as idealistic, others as quixotic, still others as undemocratic, but all

as formidable."17 In setting forth this reasoning, the court ignored all of the
tenets of first amendment rights and oppositions to patronage practices as
expressed in Elrod and Branti.
The LaFalce court also recognized what it deemed to be a significant
difference in the extent of interference from patronage practices between public
employees and independent contractors because many government contractors
also have private customers. The court reasoned that "[i]f the contractor does
not get the particular government contract on which he bids... it is not the end
of the world for him; there are other government entities to bid to, and private
ones as well. It's not like losing your job."I" The court reasoned further that
with the loss of a government contract, as opposed to the loss of a government
job, an independent contractor would feel a somewhat lesser sense of
dependency."'
This reasoning seems somewhat dubious. Arguably, if
contractors deal exclusively with, or devote a substantial portion of their
business to, government entities, the loss of a government contract may in fact
be commensurate to losing a job. Interestingly, the court attempted to discount
this argument by characterizing those contractors who have extensive
government contracts as "political hermaphrodites" who support both major
parties, and thus would not be affected as greatly by partisan policies.1'3

126. LaFalce v. Houston, 712 F.2d 292, 293 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1044
(1984). The court noted that the practice of favoring political supporters in awarding contracts for
public projects has a long history at the federal and particularly state and local levels. Id. See
general/y ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKERS: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEw YORK

713-14, 723-24, 738-39, 799 (1974); ALEXANDER HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMocRACY 144 (1960).
127. LaFalce, 712 F.2d at 294-95.
128. Id. at 294. Judge Posner, writing the opinion of the court, went on to state that "many
government workers could not find employment at the same wage in the private sector; and the
prospect that a protracted period of search following discharge might well result in a substantially
less well paid job would cause many government workers to flinch from taking political stands
adverse to their superiors." Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. The court reasoned that contractors with extensive public contracts support both major
parties, not because some contracts are issued on a partisan basis, but rather because the pervasive
role of government in modem American life has made it important for business firms to be on good
terms with the major political groupings in the society. Id. This rationale goes against the grain
of the court's argument. If the court is allowing the practice of patronage in awarding government
contracts in order to advance that party's interest, then contractors who support both parties cannot
realistically be awarded contracts based on their partisan affiliation since their loyalties are split.
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Nevertheless, the LaFalce court ultimately refused to address the applicability
of Elrod and Branti to the present situation, or to extend constitutional
protections to independent contractors.
In 1986, the Third Circuit reaffirmed the position of the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits that independent contractors are not insulated from patronage practices
by the First Amendment. In Horn v. Kean,' former New Jersey motor
vehicle agents who were chosen for their positions by a Democratic governor
through the political patronage system, were later replaced by a Republican
governor and subsequently brought claims for violations of their constitutional
rights. 32 The court, applying an almost identical analysis as that of Sweeney
and LaFalce, held that the agents were independent contractors rather than
public employees, and as such, were not within the First Amendment's
protections.' 33
Despite a more detailed analysis of the historical patronage doctrines and
the reasoning of Elrod and Branti, the Horn court held that Elrod and Branti
explicitly encompassed only the dismissal of public employees for partisan
reasons and did not include independent contractors.'"
The court did,
however, marginally address the interests of independent contractors and noted
that "the respective interests identified to be weighed by the court in Elrod and
Branti are similar to interests implicated when patronage practices affect

If contractors do support both parties by choice, then there is no coerced belief, but there is no
practical reason for the government to award contracts to those contractors since they vacillate
between two loyalties and will not effectively aid in the implementation of the party-based policies.
The LaFalce court further reasoned that "[uit seems unlikely that the cautious neutrality that
characterizes the political activities of American business would be altered even by an ironclad
constitutional rule against allowing politics to influence the contracting process." Id. at 294. Thus,
the court concludes that the "costs" outweigh the "uncertain benefits." Id. at 294-95. Such
reasoning is unconvincing in that it asserts a position of futility. The basic premise that banning
patronage in the government contracts arena will have no effect begs the question. The court refuses
to address the potential implications of protecting contractors, and then asserts that even if they did
protect contractors from patronage practices, it would not curb any of the abuses that exist presently.
131. 796 F.2d 668 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc).
132. Id. at 669-70.
133. Id.at 669.
134. Horn, 796 F.2d at 673-74. The court believed that it is beyond doubt that the teachings
of the Elrod-Brani cases did not encompass all individuals who perform compensated work for a
governmental agency. Id. See also Lundblad v. Celeste, 874 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2889 (1991). In Lundblad, the court never even reached the underlying issue
of whether Elrod and Brand should be extended to situations involving independent contractors
because no such extension was "clearly established" in 1983 in light of the Elrod-Brand holdings
not expressly extending protections to contractors, and Sweeney v. Bond, 669 F.2d 542, 545 (8th
Cir. 1982), at supra notes 114-20, refusing to extend First Amendment protections to independent
contractors for politically motivated dismissals. Lundblad, 874 F.2d at 1102.
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independent contractors. " " However, the court supplied its own reasoning
as to the vitality of the government interest in patronage and concluded that the
actual balance struck produces a different result.'3

The Horn court applied the same interests advanced by the government that
were rejected in Elrodand Branti of preservation of the democratic process and
effective implementation of the administration's program. Here, however, the
court ultimately held that party affiliation provides an effective method to
implement and accommodate these government interests that outweighs the lesser
burden imposed when a public contractor's rights are at stake rather than an
employee's. 3 Thus, as the Seventh Circuit did in LaFalce, the Horn court
concluded that independent contractors would feel a lesser sense 6f dependency,
and thus, first amendment rights are less infringed upon and insufficient to
warrant intervention in the political institutions.13s
There was a sharp dissent in this case, however, that focused on this
distinction, and lends support to contractors by discounting the validity of the
distinction in terms of the purposes of the First Amendment. 39 The dissenters
saw no distinction between public servants and independent contractors, and held
that distinction to be "entirely irrelevant to the animating purposes of the First
Amendment."" 4
Similarly, the dissenters discounted the validity of any
arguments prefaced on a difference in economic impacts between employees and
contractors, and noted that the Supreme Court has never suggested that the
availability of the substantive protection of the First Amendment depends upon

135. Horn, 796 F.2d at 674.
136. Id. at 674-75. The court again addressed the assumed understanding that partisan politics

lies at the core of our democratic process and that it is necessary for the effective implementation
of the administration's programs. Id. at 674. However, the court conceded that "the
politically-based interests sought to be advanced by patronage practices are similar whether public
employees or contractors are involved," but decided that 'the countervailing First Amendment
interests differ." Id. This distinction set forth by the court was deemed important because the
central concern of the Court in Elrod and Brani-thatpublic employees are coerced by patronage
to adopt a new belief or disassociate themselves from a particular belief-has diminished importance
when the recipient is a contractor with the state rather than a state employee. Id. The court relied
on LaFalce v. Houston to support this alleged distinction. Id. at 674-75.
137. Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668, 674 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc). The court noted that
preservation of the democratic process and implementation of the administration's programs are
certainly interests that may justify limitations on first amendment freedoms. Id. (citing Elrod v.

Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 368 (1976) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424, U.S. 1 (1976))).
138. Horn, 796 F.2d at 674-75; Rosalie Berger Levinson, Survey, State and Federal
ConstitutionalLaw Developments Affecting Indiana Law, 25 IND. L. REv. 1129, 114345 (1992)
[hereinafter Levinson, IndianaLaw Survey].
139. Horn, 796 F.2d at 680-81 (dissenting opinion). The tenets and principles argued in this
dissent will be recounted further in section V.
140. Id. at 680-81.
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the economic status of the party claiming protection.' 4'
Moreover, the
adoption of this distinction by the majority has the potential for eroding the First
Amendment's protection for millions of Americans whose livelihood depends
upon the expenditure of funds raised by federal, state, and local governmental
entities. 42 Despite the persuasiveness of the dissenters' argument, the
majority persisted in recognizing a distinction between the rights of independent
contractors and government employees. 143
Only six months before Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois was decided,
the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its position of allowing party practices to
influence government contracts in Triad Associates, Inc. v. Chicago Housing
Authority.'" Triad Associates alleged, inter alia, that the housing authority
had deprived them of their rights to free association and speech by failing to
award them contracts because they supported political opponents of the new
mayor. 45 As in LaFalce v. Houston, the Triad Associates court declined to
accept the invitation to reevaluate and extend the principles of public
employment protections to independent contractors.14
It is readily apparent that none of the circuits who had addressed this issue
prior to Rutan were willing to expand first amendment protections such as those
prescribed in Elrod and Branti to encompass independent contractors who fell
victim to political patronage practices. " The obvious reason is that neither
Elrod nor Branti expressly provide for such an extension, and the courts were
content to let the Supreme Court resolve the issue. The reasoning behind this
is unclear. Whether this refusal to extend protection to independent contractors
is based on deference to the Supreme Court or on some other judicial doctrine,

141. Horn, 796 F.2d at 681-82. The dissenters noted that the First Amendment protects all
persons in the United States regardless of the degree of economic interests suffered. Id. at 681.
Furthermore, there should be no distinction between the protections of general employees and the
general public; their rights are equal. Id. at 682. As noted by Justice White in Connick v. Myers,
"Our responsibility is to ensure that citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of
working for the government; this does not require a grant of immunity for employee grievances not
afforded by the First Amendment to those who do not work for the state. Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 147 (1983). See infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
142. Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668, 682-83 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc) (dissenting opinion).
143. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
144. 892 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. 129 (1990).
145. Id. at 584-86. The court relied upon their earlier decision in LaFalce v. Houston, 712
F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983) as applicable and binding, as well as Horn, 796 F.2d at 668.
146. Triad Assocs., 892 F.2d at 587-88. The plaintiffs in this case asked the court to reevaluate
and overturn their decision in LaFalce. The court declined to accept this invitation. Id. at 588.
The court determined that in light of the holdings of LaFakce, Fox & Co., Sweeney, and Horn, it
would decline to extend the protections granted to employees under the Elrod-Brantiline of cases,
and would leave it up to the Supreme Court to extend this principle. Id. at 587-88.
147. See supra notes 111-46 and accompanying text.
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it ultimately results in a slippery slope effect by failing to address the issue
itself, and continually relying and building upon other cases similarly failing to
address the various interests and rights involved.
No court has decided the merits of this issue, or enumerated substantive
reasons why independent contractors should not receive the same insulation from
patronage. Instead, the lower courts have relied on tradition and built a body
of case law upon what is arguably a flawed foundation." s As noted in the
dissenting opinion in Horn, none of these courts "engage in the necessary
comparison of the [government's] interests in patronage to the independent
contractors' interest in freedom of belief and association."' 49 Further, these
courts also assume, without analysis, that independent contractors lack any
substantive liberty interests that need to be accommodated to the patronage
interests of incumbent officials."se
The Seventh Circuit noted in LaFalce, "Some day the Supreme Court may
extend the principle of its public-employee cases to independent contractors. But
there are enough differences in the strength of the competing classes of cases to
persuade us not to attempt to do so."' The Horn court similarly stated, "As
the force of a First Amendment assault on state patronage practices moves from
public employment into the outer spheres of political life, we are extremely
hesitant to realign radically, in the name of the Constitution, a political
constellation that has been with us since the Republic was formed.'5 The
Triad decision supplemented this position of aversion by stating "to the extent
the protection granted to public employees under the Elrod-Brantiline of cases
may be extended to contractors, we leave that extension to the Supreme
Court. "153

This rationale indicates that to some extent, courts recognize the principles
involved and acknowledge that independent contractors have first amendment
rights that may be unconstitutionally infringed upon by patronage practices.

148. Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668, 684 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc) (dissenting opinion). The
dissenters noted that the majority's reasoning and the cases they rely on showing a "sentimental
attachment to the supposed virtues of the patronage system has led it to announce bad constitutional
law." Id. Further, "[sitaredecisis is a cornerstone of our legal system, but it has less power in
constitutional cases where, save constitutional amendments, this Court is the only body able to make
needed changes." Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Thus, the
flawed foundation is in need of repair by the Supreme Court, and the precedent should be critically
reexamined.
149. Horn, 796 F.2d at 683 (dissenting opinion).
150. Id.
151. LaFalce v. Houston, 712 F.2d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 1983).
152. Horn, 796 F.2d at 677.
153. Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Housing Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 1989).
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However, no court has been willing to take the initiative to make an in-depth
evaluation of the rights at stake or further the logical extension of first
amendment protection to independent contractors. Thus, the Supreme Court
must address this issue and extend the same protections of freedom of belief and
association afforded to government employees to encompass independent
contractors.
B. PoliticalPatronageand Independent Contractor TerminationsAfter
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois
The Seventh Circuit was unpersuaded by the precedent set in Rutan
extending constitutional protections to a number of other employment actions
and reaffirmed its staunch position that independent contractors are not shielded
from patronage practices in Downtown Auto Parks, Inc. v. City of
Milwaukee." Downtown Auto Parks brought an action against the City of
Milwaukee for its refusal to renew parking leases after it learned that Auto
Parks had lobbied against the current administration's attempts to revise the
legislature.' 55 This was the first case to address independent contractors'
rights to protection from patronage practices since Rutan, and the Seventh
Circuit was in a viable position to extend first amendment protections to
independent contractors. However, the court declined to do so, relying again
on the precedential cases that this court had decided prior to Rutan in LaFalce
v. Houston,'-" Triad Associates, Inc. v. Chicago Housing Authority,'57 as
well as Horn v. Kean"5 and Sweeney v. Bond.59
Most important, however, is the fact that the court in Downtown Auto Parks
conceded that the decision in Rutan, by significantly expanding first amendment
protection in the political patronage context, had cast doubt on the validity of the
reasoning in these four cases relied upon as precedent. " Furthermore, the
court admitted that although Rutan directly addressed only the plight of

154. 938 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 640 (1991).
155. Downtown Auto Parks, 938 F.2d at 707.
156. 712 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983).
157. 892 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1989).
158. 796 F.2d 668 (3d Cir. 1986).
159. 669 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1982).
160. Downtown Auto Parks, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 938 F.2d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 1991),
cen denied, 112 S. Ct. 640 (1991). The concession by the Seventh Circuit that the reasoning behind
these cases is questionable further supports the assumption that the entire foundation relied upon for
precedent suffers from a defect that is no longer latent in light of Rutan. See supra note 148 and
accompanying text.
In Rutan, the Supreme Court also rejected the Seventh Circuit's view that the First
Amendment only bars patronage practices that are substantially equivalent to a dismissal. Rutan v.
Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2737 (1990). See supra note 103.
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government employees and did not expressly address the first amendment rights
of independent contractors, in light of the increased protections afforded to
individuals from patronage practices, "Rutan significantly extended First
Amendment protection in the political patronage context" and "the scope of
Rutan, and rationale behind it, seem to be at odds with the holding of LaFalce
and Triad."' The court even recognized that "Rutan has altered some of the
assumptions upon which the LaFalce and Triad decisions were based" and
acknowledged that the Supreme Court had rejected the Seventh Circuit's view
that the First Amendment only barred patronage practices "substantially
equivalent to dismissal.""
However, the Downtown Auto Parks court still
relied on the holdings of these cases as unwavering precedent.
Despite these countervailing factors, the Seventh Circuit in Downtown Auto
Parks ultimately decided to limit Rutan to its facts, and again refused to extend
first amendment protections beyond the context of government employment,
premising this decision on the very cases that were at odds with Rutan. " The
fact that Rutan did not expressly extend protections outside the realm of public
employment in its holding was limiting enough for the court to refrain from
applying its principles to the instant matter. 64 Thus, the apparent shortcomings and inconsistencies in the earlier independent contractor patronage
cases, in conjunction with the increased scope of protection in Rutan, demands
a critical reevaluation and warrants the extension of constitutional protection

161. Downtown Auto Parks, 938 F.2d at 709-10.
162. Id. at 710. -See supra note 103 and accompanying text on the Seventh Circuit's
"substantial equivalent to dismissal" test.
163. Id. The court deemed Rutan to be the culmination of a line of cases "concerned only with
the constitutionality of dismissing public employees for partisan reasons," akin to E/rod and Brand.
Id. The court also reiterated its concern expressed in LaFalce of flooding the federal courts with
new first amendment claims, and supposed that the "Supreme Court apparently has less fear of the
expansion of litigation in this area for in Rutan it explicitly granted disappointed applicants, as well
as discharged employees, a cause of action." Id. at 709. However, no such flood has occurred as
of present.
Identical treatment was recently given to a claim alleging that school board members violated
plaintiff's first amendment rights by failing to renew his school bus transportation contract after he
refused to support the candidate favored by the school board, in Lewis v. Hager, No. 91-5621, 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 4399 (6th Cir., Mar. 10, 1992) (table opinion) (not intended for publication).
There, the Sixth Circuit looked for binding precedent and, while not even acknowledgingRutan, 110
S. Ct. at 2729, followed the earlier cases of Downtown Auto Parks, 938 F.2d at 705, and Lundblad
v. Celeste, 874 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2889 (1992), in holding there
is no law clearly establishing a constitutional violation when public contracts are awarded on the
basis of partisan politics. Lewis v. Hager, No. 91-5621, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 4399 (6th Cir.,
Mar. 10, 1992).
164. Downtown Auto Parks, 938 F.2d at 710. The court specifically set forth that "Rutan did
extend First Amendment protection, but only within the context of government employment. Rutan
was the culmination of a line of cases concerned only with the constitutionality of dismissing public
employees for partisan reasons." Id.
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from political patronage practices to independent contractors by the Supreme
Court.
V. A

PROPOSAL FOR EXTENDING FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
FROM POLITICAL PATRONAGE PRACTICES TO
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS

The Supreme Court must decisively address the first amendment rights of
independent contractors in the political patronage context. It is apparent that
even in light of Rutan, the lower federal courts are not willing to expound upon
the continuous trend granting greater constitutional protections to individuals
without a Supreme Court ruling expressly insulating independent contractors or
other non-governmental employees from political patronage practices."s The
imminent result has been an inconsistent body of precedent that ignores the
rights of independent contractors and that has been followed reverently without
question or distinction. Absent an express provision in Elrod and Brand
indicating that other forms of patronage should be abolished outside of the public
employee context, the lower court opinions limit these cases solely to public
employees. 166

The Supreme Court in Rutan expanded the scope of patronage practices that
offend the First Amendment to include promotion, transfer, recall, and
hiring. 6" The Supreme Court extended the provisions of the Elrod-Branti
decisions in Rutan to encompass other adverse employment actions, although
6
neither Elrod nor Brand expressly addressed patronage in these contexts.' 8

165. See supra notes 111-64 and accompanying text.
166. The only exception made allowing patronage in the Elrod-Brand cases were for those
positions requiring party affiliation for the effective performance of the public office involved.
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980), see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. The
Court was silent as to any positions or other areas in between.
167. See Rutan v. RepublicanParty of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990), discussed at supranotes
89-110 and accompanying text. But see generally S. Jay Dobbs, supra note 34 (arguing that despite
Rutan's positive effects, the decision has created more problems than it has solved: it destroys the
working-class citizen's participation in the two-party system; it will create a flood of litigation by
disgruntled employees; it will have little practical effect on curbing patronage; and future
employment decisions will be disguised as based on other factors, or as mixed-motive decisions).
168. The effect of this culmination of patronage cases from Elrod through Rutan is to expand
the scope of first amendment protections to individuals from patronage practices. This increasing
expansion is obviously derived from inherent rights rather than an express grant of protection within
the cases. The courts who have denied extension of constitutional protections to independent
contractors claim this is because the Elrod-Brami-Rutanholdings did not expressly address the rights
of independent contractors. This does not mean that these rights are nonexistent. The Supreme
Court in Rutan expanded the scope of protections to include denial of promotion, transfer, recall,
or hire, but the express textual commitment of Elrod and Brand was limited to dismissal only. See
supra note 91 and accompanying text. The Court in Rutan obviously extended these protections
absent an express intent to encompass these employment decisions in Elrod.
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Similarly, the Court rejected the position that the actions had to be substantially
equivalent to that of a dismissal to warrant protection."e Thus, the next
logical step is to allow constitutional protection for independent contractors
whose contracts have been terminated, not renewed, or initially denied as a
result of party politics. The success of continuing this expansionist approach of
providing first amendment protection from political patronage practices thus
depends upon the Supreme Court addressing the issue of non-governmental
employees head-on and resolving the lack of express authority problem that has
been plaguing the federal courts.
In addressing this issue, the Supreme Court will undoubtedly rely on the
arguments and holdings of Elrod, Branti, and Rutan in assessing the merits of
a claim by an independent contractor. It follows that focusing on the same three
recurrent areas of concern stressed in those cases will provide a useful
framework in which to assess the constitutionality of patronage in the
non-employee realm. Thus, the validity of an extension of first amendment
protection to independent contractors will depend on whether patronage places
restraints upon the free exercise of belief and association of independent
contractors, whether the government is denying or conditioning the receipt of
a government benefit on a relinquishment of these rights, and whether the
competing governmental interests in practicing patronage as to independent
contractors are compelling and the least restrictive of first amendment
rights. 170
The first concern is whether the patronage practice encroaches upon
independent contractors' freedoms of belief and association. Inherent in the
language of Elrod itself is that the inevitable tendency of a political patronage
system is to improperly coerce employees into compromising their true political
beliefs."'7 Rutan mirrored this position in terms of patronage promotions,
transfers, and recalls, holding that patronage pressures employees to pledge their
political allegiance to a party with which they prefer not to associate, and further
policies with which Jhey do not agree.'7 This is "tantamount to coerced
belief.""
Thus, individuals who find themselves not in the dominant party are forced
to surrender their exercise of protected belief and association by refraining from

169. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2737. See supra note 103.
170. See Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2729, discussed at supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text;
Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), discussed at supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
171. E/rod, 427 U.S. at 357-59. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
172. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. at 2734. See supra notes 95-96 and
accompanying text.
173. Erod, 427 U.S. at 355 (citing Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976)).
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acting on the political views they actually hold in order to retain their job. 4
Patronage-based hiring similarly coerces beliefs and unconstitutionally infringes
upon individuals' protected rights according to Rutan.'" A state job is
valuable, and "there may be openings with the State when business in the private
sector is slow. There are also occupations for which the government is a major
(or the only) source of employment." 7 6
These situations are readily
analogous to the situations of independent contractors. It is not questionable that
a government contract is valuable or that some types of contracting work are
exclusive to government control." Public contracts offer an available market
for contractors to participate in to earn their livelihood. Limiting the availability
of this market by conditioning contracts on partisan affiliations impermissibly
hinders free belief and association. As with the denial of a state job, the loss
or rejection of a public contract is equatable to a job opportunity, and is equally
a "serious privation. " " Thus, "loss of a job opportunity for failure to
compromise one's convictions states a constitutional claim. "" Alternatively,
if individuals greatly desire certain government contracts, they will suppress
their free speech and associational rights in order to successfully obtain and
establish such contracts. In either situation, sacrificing one's political affiliations
and convictions or sacrificing a public contract results in the oppression of
constitutional liberties, and the choice is, in fact, no choice at all.
Similarly, arguments speculating that the coerciveness associated with
public employees is diminished when an independent contractor simply loses one
"customer" due to the patronage practice,"8' or that an independent contractor
would feel a lesser sense of dependency, thus making first amendment rights
more attenuated and insufficient to require intervention into the political
institution,'' are unconvincing. Independent contractors may significantly rely
on public contracts as a source of employment and income just as employees do.
Regardless, the amount of reliance is not the critical inquiry in terms of
constitutional magnitude when an individual is being denied access to public
"employment." By denying contracts based on party affiliation, patronage
contracting is coercive in the same manner that patronage employment is

174. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2736.
175. Id. at 2739.
176. Id. at 2738.
177. See supra note 112.
178. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (1990).
179. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (holding that Maryland could not refuse
an appointee a commission for the position of notary public on the ground the he refused to take an
oath declaring his belief in God, because the oath unconstitutionally invaded the individual's freedom
of belief).
180. Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Housing Auth., 892 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1989). See also
Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668, 673-75 (3d Cir. 1986).
181. Honm, 796 F.2d at 674-75.
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coercive.
More importantly, the Court in Rutan stated: "The question in the
patronage context is not which penalty is more acute, but whether the
government, without sufficient justification, is pressuring employees to
discontinue the free exercise of their first amendment rights.""s In the case
of independent contractors, as with employees, the answer to this question is
clearly "yes." The constitutional wrong condemned in Elrod, Branti, and Rutan
was the government's attempt to control the beliefs and associations of its
citizens. i" That control can be just as effective and offensive when the
government reduces the citizen's income by twenty percent as when the
government reduces the citizen's interest by one hundred percent-"[tlhe
constitutionally significant point is not the quantum of impact, but rather it is the
impact itself " ' While independent contractors may not lose all their income
if a public contract is withdrawn, "the knowledge that their income would drop
by ten percent may be sufficient to induce the contractors to conform their
Support for this position
political views to those of the reigning power.""
is analogously seen in Rutan in terms of denying promotions, recalls, or hiring.
The loss is just as great when a contractor is denied a contract as when a public
employee is denied a promotion, recall or hire. The ultimate termination of all
economic benefits is not the main concern, but rather that some benefits are
being denied in terms of lost opportunities as a result of coercive patronage
practices.
Strong support for this view abounds in the dissenting opinion of Horn v.
Kean.'s" The dissenters acknowledged that the opinions of Elrod and Brand
rest squarely upon the government's interference with the federally protected
substantive liberty interest of freedom from government attempts to control
The Supreme Court has never suggested that "the
beliefs and associations.'
availability of the substantive protection of the first amendment depends upon
the economic status of the party claiming that protection. The first amendment

182. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2739. Along these lines, in the instant matter the Court determined
that it was not necessary to consider whether not being hired is less burdensome than being
discharged because the government can do neither on the basis of political affiliation. Id.
183. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515-17 (1980); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 372
(1976).
184. Horn, 796 F.2d at 683 (dissenting opinion).
185. Id. at 683. This chilling effect on citizens' first amendment rights produced the holding
in Elrod and Brand, and because the same chilling effect inhibits independent contractors who lose
their contracts because of their political views, the rule of Elrod and Brand is equally applicable to
the case of independent contractors. Id.
186. Horn v. King, 796 F.2d 668, 680 (3d Cir. 1986) (en bane) (dissenting opinion).
187. Id. (dissenting opinion).
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protects all persons in the United States.""
In a similar argument, the Horn dissenters found the competing first
amendment rights of public employees and independent contractors to be'equal.
The dissenters argued that Elrod and Branti did not announce any revolutionary
first amendment rights applicable only to servants of the government, but rather
they rejected the contention that public employees had fewer first amendment
rights than other members of society."s Thus, by treating the Elrod-Branti
rule as applicable only to servants of the government, the cases that have denied
protections to independent contractors have managed to avoid the balancing of
interests required by the Constitution."
The second concern is whether patronage conditions or penalizes the receipt
of a government benefit at the cost of individual rights. It is clear that
patronage systems themselves have the effect of imposing unconstitutional
conditions on the receipt of a public benefit.'' Public employees hold their
jobs on the condition that they provide support for the favored political party.
This has the effect of the government producing a result which it could not
command directly itself.9"
Like government employees, this similarly
implicates individual rights of independent contractors by forcing them to

188. Horn, 796 F.2d at 681 (dissenting opinion). The court premised this reasoning on a
hypothetical change in facts to Elrod:
If Elrod v. Buns were a procedural due process case aimed at the protection of
an expectation in continued employment found in state law, the distinction adopted by
the majority between servants and independent contractors arguably would be relevant.
In such a hypothetical case, the degree of due process protection might well depend on
the degree of economic dependence of the plaintiff on the contract or property right
being terminated. In Elrod, however, there was no state-law expectation in the
continuance of an at-will employment relationship.
Id. at 681 (footnotes omitted).
189. Id. at 680 (dissenting opinion). This interpretation of Elrod and Brand is consistent with
the Court's treatment of public employee first amendment claims prior to and since 1980. See, e.g.,
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding that the public employee enjoyed
the same first amendment right to free expression as did the general public); see also supra notes
45-51 and accompanying text. More recently, in Connick v. Myers, the Court held that the first
amendment rights of public employees were the same as, not greater than, those of the general
public. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983); see also supra notes 45-51 and accompanying
text. Justice White opined that '[olur responsibility is to ensure that citizens are not deprived of
fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government; this does not require a grant to those
who do not work for the State." Id. The dissenters in Horn believed that the judges in the majority
were standing the Supreme Court's reasoning in these cases on its head by treating public employees
as if they have rights not conferred upon others. Horn, 796 F.2d at 683 (dissenting opinion).
190. Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668, 683 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc).
191. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 357-59 (1976). See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying
text.
192. Id. at 358-59 (quoting Spieser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
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suppress or give up their true speech and associational beliefs to receive a public
contract. Rutan also recognized that the government may not condition valuable
benefits on relinquishing constitutional rights or deny those benefits to a person
on a basis that infringes upon an individual's constitutionally protected

interests.t93
Further support for this rationale is evidenced by the Elrod Court's
indication that there is a lack of distinction between the economic interests at
stake between public employees and contractors in conditioning benefits upon
party affiliation. The Court specifically stated:
mhe inducement afforded by placing conditions on a benefit need not
be particularly great in order to find that rights have been violated.
Rights are infringed both where the government fines a person one
penny for being a Republican and where it withholds the grant of a
penny for the same reason.94
One recent case, North Mississippi Communications, Inc. v. Jones, 95
addresses this issue and stresses that equal constitutional weight should be given
to penalties hindering the receipt of government benefits, regardless of their
degree. This case expands Elrod, Branti, and Rutan beyond their limitation to
government employees."s6 In North Mississippi Communications, the Fifth

193. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2736 (1990).
194. EMrod, 427 U.S. at 359-60 n.13. Further noted by the Court was the fact that the
increasingly pervasive nature of public employment provides officials with substantial power through
conditioning jobs on partisan support. Because the government, however, may not seek to achieve
an unlawful end either directly or indirectly, the degree of penalization is not the focus of
unconstitutionality. Id. at 360.
Also worth noting isthat the supposed economic differences between state servants and state
independent contractors isat best relevant only in a due process protection of property interests
context. It has never been suggested that the substantive liberty rights enshrined in the First
Amendment vary with the economic status of the party exercising them. Horn, 796 F.2d at 683

(dissenting opinion).
195. 951 F.2d 652 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 184 (1992).
North Mississippi
196. North Mississippi Communications, 951 F.2d at 653-54.
Communications is distinguishable from the other independent contractor cases because it is
concerned only with the proper burden-shifting approach for the newspaper's § 1983 claim and is
more akin to the "Connick-type" political speech as discussed at supra notes 45-51 and
accompanying text. Similarly, this case involved what was equivalent to a mixed-motive discharge,

involving termination based on political affiliation in conjunction with other factors, rather than the
overt discharge solely for political patronage reasons which is the focus of this Note.

However, in a broader context, this case expands the constitutional protections for non-public
employees. The court extended the applicability of the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting analysis,
discussed below, which provides more protection to independent contractors in this context interms
of the amount of proof required to show a violation of a constitutionally protected right. The Mt.
Healthy test has been used as the standard for assessing the constitutionality of mixed-motive
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Circuit held that the DeSoto County Board of Supervisors' withholding of legal
notice advertising from a newspaper in retaliation for not supporting the Board
and printing negative stories about their policies violated important constitutional
rights."7 This case expands protections for non-public employees by holding
that the Board's denial of awarding even one county legal notice based upon the

patronage dismissals. See, e.g., Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1981) (involving a
dispute regarding the motive of a public employee). See also DeCore v. City of Parma, No.
91-4170, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25072 (6th Cir., Oct. 7, 1992) (not intended for publication)
(addressing that discharge of city employee for political reasons who would have been terminated
in any event under Mt. Healthy does not offend the Constitution). For a further and more in depth
discussion of the mixed-motive discharge standard, see generally Robert S. Whitman, Note, Clearing
the Mixed-Motive Smokescreen: An Approach to DisparateTreatment Under Title VII, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 863 (1989); Mark S. Brodin, The Standardof Causation in the Mixed-Motive itle VII
Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 292 (1982); Mark S. Wolly, What Hath
Mr. Healthy Wrought?, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 385 (1980); Kevin W. Dogan, The Supreme Court'sAttack
on PoliticalPatronageFrom Elrod to Rutan: What does it Mean for Indiana Elected Officials?,
MunicipalLaw, in INDIANA CONTINUINGLEoAL EDUCATION FORUM (1991). Furthermore, "facially
neutral" firing decisions-those not overtly considering political affiliations-may also be challenged
as unconstitutional patronage dismissals and involves a content-neutral analysis, although no court
has considered precisely this issue. Thomas L. Pantalion, Comment, Republicans Only Need Apply:
PatronageHiring and the FirstAmendment in Avery v. Jennings, 71 MINN. L. REv. 1374, 1383
(1987). These two areas are, however, beyond the scope of this note and will not be discussed in
great detail except as relevant.
Mt. Healthy Ciy School Dist. Rd. ofEduc. v. Doyle involved the refusal to reemploy a public
school teacher because of the teacher's exercise of his free speech rights which violated his first and
fourteenth amendment rights. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977). This case gave birth to the two step burden-shifting role, which has now become standard
in discrimination cases. The Supreme Court held that (1) the plaintiff must first show that his
constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's decision;
and (2) if the plaintiff carries this burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even in the absence of the
protected conduct. M. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 274.
In North Mississippi Communications, the DeSoto County Board argued that this analysis is
unique to cases involving termination of employment or refusal to rehire. North Mississippi
Communications, 951 F.2d at 655 n.10 (5th Cir. 1992). The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument,
and saw no reason why Mt. Healthy should not be applied in the patronage context since "Mt.
Healthy's rule is broad enough potentially to lend itself to a wide variety of fact patterns." Id. at
654. This case concluded that denying benefits to a party in retaliation for exercising
constitutionally protected rights violates the First Amendment. Here, that party was an independent
newspaper, and the court's analysis arguably applies equally when applied in the independent
contractor context where contracts are denied based on the exercise of a valid constitutional right.
Furthermore, North Mississippi Communicationsis the first case to break with the line of cases
denying commensurate protections from patronage for independent contractors, discussed at supra
notes 111-64. In fact, the court did not take into account any of the cases involving political
patronage in the context of independent contractors, thus, expanding the potential scope of Elrod,
Branti, and Rutan beyond their alleged "express" limitation to government employees. Most
importantly, the court expressly set forth that retaliatory denial of publication of even one county
legal notice, as a government benefit, violates the First Amendment. Id.
197. North Mississippi Communications, 951 F.2d at 653-54.
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publication of non-supportive stories about the Board constitutes a violation of
the First Amendment. 1'" The court rejected any argument that the "bulk" of
the advertisements would have to be denied for political reasons in order to
constitute a first amendment violation.199 This case illustrates that in terms of
constitutional importance, the fact that a right is violated, regardless of how
slight that violation is, constitutes a valid claim.
The Supreme Court has recognized the lack of distinction between the
rights of independent contractors and public employees in another important
context. In Lefkowitz v. Turley,2' the Supreme Court invalidated a state
statute requiring public contractors to waive their fifth amendment immunity
from self-incrimination in any proceeding relating to their government contract
or face a five year ban from doing further business with the government."
The Court held that the waiver was not voluntary, but rather that it was
coerced. 20 Consequently, the Court held that disqualification from public
contracting was a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege.'
The Supreme Court recognized that although independent contractors may
not depend entirely on transactions with the State for their livelihood, they
"failed to see a difference of constitutional magnitude between the threat of job
loss to an employee of the State, and a threat of loss of contracts to a

198. Id. at 656. The Board is appealing this case, alleging that the court "failed to take into
account cases involving political patronage in [the] context of independent contractor[s]," which
expands the Elrod-Brani-Rutan trilogy beyond their limitation to government employees, and
"thereby conflicts with every other circuit that has addressed [this] issue." DeSoto County Bd. of
Supervisors v. North Mississippi Communications, Inc., 61 U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. Aug. 25, 1993).
However, certiorari was denied. DeSoto County Bd. of Supervisors v. North Mississippi
Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 184 (1992).
199. North Mississippi Communications, 951 F.2d at 656. This court addressed numerous
factors in determining whether this retaliation posed a valid infringement on the newspaper's (the
Times') first amendment rights. In assessing this claim, the court applied the burden-shifting
analysis of Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 274; see supra note 196. It is unfortunate, however, that
certiorari was denied in this case. This forestalls the clarification of this issue, and continues to
leave unresolved the question of patronage practices outside of government employees.
200. 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Survey, ConstitutionalLaw: Nude Dancing
and Political Speech as Protected Expression-The Scope of the Due Process Guarantee, 24 IND.
L. REv. 697 (1991).
201. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 70-76 (1973).
202. Id. at 82-83. The Court specifically noted that "[t]he waiver sought by the State, under
threat of loss of contracts, would have been no less compelled than a direct request for the testimony
without resort to the waiver device. A waiver secured under threat of substantial economic sanction
cannot be termed voluntary." Id.
203. Id. at 83.
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contractor."'
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected any arguments
that the cost to a contractor is small in comparison to the cost to an employee
of losing a job, or that it is harder for a state employee to find employment in
the private sector than it is for an independent contractor.'
Justice Stevens
cited the conclusion of Lefkowitz in Branti v. Finkel, noting that "many . . .
practices are included within the definition of a patronage system, including.
. . granting supporters lucrative government contracts . . . ."
In light of
Rutan's increased protections, this decision is applicable to positions outside of
government employment and recognizes independent contractors rights as
tantamount to those of public employees. Thus, in terms of the corresponding
rights at stake, and the equivalent unconstitutional penalties imposed on
independent contractors by patronage practices, this recognition carries equal
weight when applied to first amendment protections for independent contractors.
The third critical concern is whether the government's interests in "firing"
independent contractors because of their political associations are sufficiently
compelling to overcome the contractors' first amendment interests. Because

there are impairments to contractors' constitutional freedoms, along with the fact
that the loss of a promotion, transfer, or rehire is considered a significant
penalty to trigger strict scrutiny, the loss of a government contract evokes the
same analysis. Thus, a compelling state interest is required to override the
valuable rights of the contractors.'
In the lower court cases that have addressed this issue, the only government
interest that is even mentioned is the interest in political patronage itself.'

204. Id. The Court followed Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), stating that the
option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of giving up constitutional freedoms
is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or remain silent. Id. at 497.
The court in Horn v. Kean acknowledged this lack of distinction between public employees'
and independent contractors' rights, but determined that Leftowitz did not control the outcome.
Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668, 675-76 (3d Cir. 1986). The court determined that Loejtwitz
concerned well-settled Fifth Amendment rights, whereas their court had a different task of analyzing
unsettled first amendment rights as prescribed by the holdings of Elrod and Brand, and refused to
apply it to their present facts. Id. at 676.
205. Leftowtz, 414 U.S. at 83-84. An architect lives off contracting fees as surely as a state
employee lives off salary, and fees and salaries may be equally hard to come by in the private sector
after sanctions have been taken by the State. In some senses, the plight of the architect may be
worse since he may be subject to future contract cancellations. Id. at 84. "A significant
infringement of constitutional rights cannot be justified by the speculative ability of those affected
to cover the damage." Id.
206. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 513 n.7 (1980). Furthermore, the court declined to
extend the protections to independent contractors because the Supreme Court in Elrod and Branti
limited its rulings to public employees, and it was not for their court to expand upon that ruling.
Id. at 676.
207. Levinson, IndianaLaw Survey, supra note 138, at 1144.
208. Horn, 796 F.2d at 683 (dissenting opinion).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss1/8

Moyer: The Future of Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois: A Proposal f

1993]

RUTAN V. REPUBLICAN PARTY

415

This is "an interest found wanting in Elrod, and an interest that has never been
recognized in a first amendment context by a majority of the Supreme
Court. "'

Thus, it is not evident that the government's interest in patronage takes on
greater weight in the independent contractor context-indeed, just the opposite
may prove to be true. 210 By affording the public employees greater first
amendment rights than independent contractors and members of the public, the
government will be encouraged to contract out of governmental functions.
Public employees will no longer be needed because their work will be contracted
out, and then they can be freely discharged as surplus. 21 ' Consequently, the
government will remain free to pressure contractors and their employees to
support incumbent politicians or parties. The contractors and their employees
will be forced against their will to contribute time, money, and loyalty to a party
not of their choice, and they will be without a remedy.2 2 Thus, the state
interest may take on less weight when applied in this context.
The only government interest recognized by the Elrod-Brani Court as
sufficient to justify a limitation on first amendment rights was the government's
interest in having policymaking or essentially political positions occupied by
persons aligned with the policies espoused by the administration. 213 Patronage
was allowed as the least restrictive means of accomplishing the governmental
ends in those contexts.214 However, such party affiliation has never been
deemed crucial to public contracts, and thus, the benefits of patronage do not
exceed the loss of first amendment rights as strict scrutiny demands. Although
hiring politically affiliated contractors may be an effective way to implement the
administration's program, the work of the government should not be a conduit
through which political factions gain and wield economic power. 211 Promoting
these ends to the detriment of the political society cannot be the least restrictive
means to accomplish government policy implementation, especially in the

209. Id. In discounting the majority's opinion in Horn, the dissenters note that even in
identifying this interest, the majority does not engage in the necessary comparison of the state's
interests in patronage to the independent contractors' interests in freedom of belief and association.
Id. The majority assumes without analysis that independent contractors lack any serious interests
that need to be insulated from patronage. Id.
210. Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668, 683 (3d Cir. 1986) (dissenting opinion).
211. Id. at 684. The dissenting opinion in Horn presents a persuasive scenario which illustrates
this argument.
212. Id. at 683 (dissenting opinion).
213. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 366,
372-73 (1976).
214. See generally Elrod, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
215. Horn, 796 F.2d at 685 (dissenting opinion).
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independent contractor context. 2 6
As with the narrow exception for
policymaking positions, unless an independent contractor's political affiliation
clearly indicates it will compromise the government's ability to discharge its
responsibilities, the government should not be entitled to disable aspects of a
contractor's political commitment that lie at the core of responsible
217
citizenship.
The government's only other asserted interests are securing efficient and
effective employees and preserving the democratic process and the two-party
system. These are not vital interests, as rejected in the Elrod-Branti-Rutan
cases,

and

Government

can

be

served

without

relying

activity

which

unnecessarily

on

restricts

patronage
certain

practices. 2 '
constitutional

protections, even if only minimally, must fail; the government must find other
means of achieving their desired goals that will create less interference with
individual freedoms.2 1 9

The individuals acquiring certain governmental positions have the right to
affiliate with political parties. However, the government, as an artificial entity,

has a collective interest in efficiency, but the government itself has no right
under the First Amendment or any other constitutional or statutory provision to
advance the interests of a political party.3'
The effect of supporting an
interest in political affiliation gives individuals, who have gained powerful
government positions, and their parties, a forum to assert their own political

interests as "government interests." In asserting their interest, the party-position
holders are ultimately using the economic power of the government "for the
purpose of preventing other members of the political collective from competing
effectively to replace them.""2
Whether the parties involved are employees
or contractors, the Constitution, which carefully devises checks and balances for

216. See infra note 218.
217. Peter M. Shane, Rubin: A Glimpse at his Contributions to the Law: The Rust That
Corrodes: State Action, Free Speech, and Responsibility, 52 LA. L. REV. 1585, 1596 (1992).
218. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2739 (1990). Just as the
government can ensure employee effectiveness and efficiency through the less drastic means of
discharging those staff members whose work is inadequate, so can the government ensure effective
contracting by employing the same means. Furthermore, the "political process" functions as well
without patronage practices, perhaps even better. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. at 368-70. As with the
employment context, patronage in the contractor context "can result in the entrenchment of one or
a few parties to the exclusion of others" and "is a very effective impediment to the associational and
speech freedoms which are essential to a meaningful system of democratic government." Id. at 370.
219. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972). See also Schneider, supra note 18, at
526-29.
220. Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668, 684 (3d Cir. 1986) (dissenting opinion).
221. Id. at 684-85. Further, utilizing government revenues for the purpose of enhancing the
position of the reigning political faction to the disadvantage of all others flies in the face of our
constitutional system. Ed. at 685.
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the resolution of tension among competing interest groups, never intended to
allow one political party to use government positions or economic power as a
weapon in its competition with other political parties.=
Thus, the Supreme Court needs to address the issue of extending
constitutional protections to independent contractors. Upon undertaking such an
endeavor, these three separate but interrelated interests mandate that independent
contractors should be protected from the same patronage practices that
detrimentally encroach upon the first amendment rights of government
employees. Therefore, the Supreme Court should rule that the government may
not use political patronage practices to award, renew, or terminate public
contracts.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In light of this expansionist approach originating from Elrod v. Burns,m
followed by Brand v. Finkel,' and culminating in Rutan v. Republican Party
of Illinois, ' denying public contractors the same rights afforded to public
employees warrants a critical reevaluation. Based on these arguments, bolstered
by the majority decision in Rutan indicating a greater accommodation for
individual rights, and in conjunction with incomplete federal case law restricting
first amendment protections, it is obvious that the scope of insulation from
political patronage warrants a detailed analysis and clear guidelines setting forth
which areas of government practice mandatory party affiliation will be tolerated.
Although conceding that the respective interests implicated by the Supreme
Court in Elrod and Brand are basically the same interests implicated when
patronage practices affect independent contractors, the lower courts have made
it clear that they are not willing to address the competing interests of
independent contractors and thus are not willing to expand the provisions of
Elrod, Branti, or Rutan. Equally clear is that the lower courts will leave any
extension of this principle to the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has yet to address the rights of independent contractors in a patronage
context.
Although the next logical step in the Court's patronage doctrine is to extend
constitutional protections to independent contractors, it is unclear whether this
issue will ever be addressed definitively by the Supreme Court. Ironically, it
is also unclear whether, if it is addressed, the expansionist approach towards

222.
223.
224.
225.

Horn, 796 F.2d at 685 (dissenting opinion).
427 U.S. 347 (1976). See also supra note 67.
445 U.S. 507 (1980).
110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990).
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greater first amendment protection of individual rights will prevail to insulate
independent contractors. Because Rutan was a five-four decision authored by
Justice Brennan, his absence on the Court, coupled with Justice Marshall's
absence, may signal the end of this approach,226 thus ultimately sealing the fate
of independent contractors. It is questionable whether Justice Souter and Justice
Thomas, whose views are more unknown in this context, but probably akin to
those of the dissenters in Rutan, would uphold such an extension. On the other
hand, with the succession of President Bill Clinton and his Democratic
administration to the White House, thereby replacing the twelve-year Republican
reign, the Supreme Court may extend protections to independent contractors to
dissuade or remedy any large-scale attempts by President Clinton to "clean
house" of Republican contract-holders and reward political supporters with
government contracts. Furthermore, President Clinton has announced his plan
to eliminate or phase out several thousand federal positions over the course of
his presidency. The jobs usually performed by these government employees
may consequently be contracted out to Democrats in the private sector. This has
the potentiality of infringing upon the first amendment rights of individual
independent contractors in the private sector, which also may force the Court to
extend first amendment protections outside of the government employment
sphere.
Nevertheless, while acknowledging that there are potential weaknesses and
numerous criticisms to curtailing party practices outside the context of public
employees, this subject warrants a critical analysis. Firmer parameters on the
types of non-government employment decisions that are subject to first
amendment challenges, and thus warranting protection, should be sought.
Similarly, a practical standard for determining which practices are exempt from
party politics is in order. The only way to successfully accomplish this task is
for the Supreme Court to acknowledge that the first amendment rights of
independent contractors are unconstitutionally infringed upon by having public
contracts that are motivated by political patronage terminated, not renewed, or
rejected at the bidding stage. This result would be just and in alignment with
the basic tenets that the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
espouses and protects.
Bradford S. Moyer

226. Levinson, Indiana Law Survey, supra note 138, at 1145.
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